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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, we introduce and study robust optimization models and decom-
position algorithms in order to deal with the uncertainties such as terrorist attacks, natural
disasters, and uncertain demand that are becoming more and more signiﬁcant in power sys-
tems operation and planning. An optimal power grid hardening problem is presented as a
defender-attacker-defender (DAD) sequential game and solved by an exact decomposition
algorithm. Network topology control, which is an eﬀective corrective measure in power sys-
tems, is then incorporated into the defender-attacker-defender model as a recourse operation
for the power system operator after a terrorist attack. Computational results validate the
cost-eﬀectiveness of the novel model. In addition, a resilient distribution network planning
problem (RDNP) is proposed in order to coordinate the hardening and distributed gener-
ation resource placement with the objective of minimizing the distribution system damage
under uncertain natural disaster events. A multi-stage and multi-zone based uncertainty set
is designed to capture the spatial and temporal dynamics of a natural disaster as an extension
to the N -K worst-case network interdiction approach. Finally, a power market day-ahead
generation scheduling problem, i.e., robust unit commitment (RUC) problem, that takes
account of uncertain demand is analyzed. Improvements have been made in achieving a fast
solution algorithm for the RUC model.
vi
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The electric power grid is the largest machine in the whole world. As one of the thir-
teen critical infrastructures, the power grid is the backbone of our society since almost every
aspect of the society relies on the electric power from the power grid. However, the oper-
ation and planning models in power systems are getting more and more complicated. The
uncertainties that come from terrorist attacks and natural disasters have caused concerns
on the vulnerability of the power grids both in the transmission network level and the dis-
tribution network level. Moreover, on the one hand, new technologies, such as renewable
generation, demand side management, distributed generation, smart grids, etc., have greatly
improved the eﬃciency and reliability of the modern grid. On the other hand, these tech-
nologies are adding new complexities such as uncertain renewable generation and demand to
the operation models and causing new reliability issues in the power grid. Hence, in order to
deal with the more and more signiﬁcant uncertainties in the power girds, we propose robust
optimization based operation and planning models and design decomposition algorithms to
solve these models.
In Chapter 2, a power grid protection planning problem on the transmission systems is
considered to address the vulnerability issue of uncertain terrorist attacks on the transmission
network. The power grid protection problem is often formulated as a tri-level defender-
attacker-defender model. However, this tri-level problem is computationally challenging
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and no exact solution is provided in the literature. In order to tackle this fundamental
problem, in this chapter, we design and implement a decomposition algorithm to derive
its optimal solutions. Numerical results are given on an IEEE one-area RTS- 1996 system
show that the developed algorithm identiﬁes optimal solutions in a reasonable time, which
signiﬁcantly outperforms an existing algorithm. We also conﬁrm that the protection plan
obtained through solving the attacker-defender model does not lead to the optimal protection
plan in general.
In Chapter 3, the transmission network topology through transmission line switch-
ing, as an eﬀective corrective operation for power system operators to improve the eco-
nomic operations of the electric transmission network, is modeled and analyzed in the power
grid defender-attacker-attacker model framework. The preventive approach, i.e., protection,
and the corrective approach, i.e., network topology control, are coordinated in the pro-
posed defender-attacker-defender model with transmission line switching (DAD-TLS). We
customize and implement nested decomposition algorithm to derive optimal solutions. Nu-
merical experiments are performed on the IEEE one-area RTS-1996 system. Results verify
the beneﬁts of incorporating transmission line switching as a post-contingency operation into
DAD model.
Natural disasters such as Hurricane Sandy can seriously disrupt the power grids. To
increase the resilience of a distribution system against uncertain natural disasters, Chapter
4 proposes a resilient distribution network planning problem (RDNP) in order to coordinate
the hardening and distributed generation resources with the objective of minimizing the
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system damage. The problem is formulated as a two-stage robust optimization model. A
multi-stage and multi-zone based uncertainty set is designed to capture the spatial and
temporal dynamics of an uncertain natural disaster as an extension to the N -K worst-
case network interdiction approach. The optimal solution yields a resilient distribution
system against natural disasters. A decomposition algorithm is designed to solve this tri-
level program. Computational studies demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the proposed model.
The computational results also reveal that distributed generation is important in increasing
the resilience of a distribution system against natural disasters in the form of microgrids.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we explore the robust unit commitment (RUC) problem that is
considered to be the cornerstone in power systems operations. The two-stage robust unit
commitment problem is proposed to deal with various complicated uncertainties in power
systems, including those in renewable generation, load realization, demand response, and
contingencies. However, such tri-level optimization problem is very challenging to solve,
considering large-scale real power grids. In this Chapter, we study new computational meth-
ods and strategies to address this challenge, including incorporating strong formulations
for basic unit commitment model, deriving new valid inequalities considering network con-
straints, and designing and implementing a decomposition procedure. On large-scale test
instances, our solution approach leads to signiﬁcantly better computational performance,
compared to existing formulations or methods.
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the work in designing
exact solution power grid defender-attack-defender. Chapter 3 presents a defender-attacker-
3
defender model with transmission network topology control. Chapter 4 corresponds to a dis-
tribution network planning problem against uncertain natural disasters. Chapter 5 presents
the work in developing a fast algorithm for robust unit commitment problem.
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CHAPTER 2: DEFENDER-ATTACKER-DEFENDER MODEL FOR
POWER GRID PROTECTION
2.1 Note to Reader
This chapter has been previously published on Elsevier as: Wei Yuan, Long Zhao
and Bo Zeng, optimal power grid protection through a defender-attacker-defender model,
Reliability Engineering & System Safety [1]. The second author, Dr. Long Zhao, contributed
for part of the technical section. Third author, Dr. Bo Zeng, contributed for identifying the
background of this application.
2.2 Background
Power grid vulnerability is a critical issue in modern society. According to a recent
study by the National Research Council, a terrorist attack on the U.S. power grid could be
much more destructive than natural disasters such as Hurricane Sandy, by blacking out large
segments of the country for weeks or even months, costing hundreds of billions of economic
damage, and leading to thousands of deaths due to heat stress or exposure to cold during the
blackout [2]. Roughly, 200 terrorist attacks on power grids have been reported outside of the
U.S. over the past few decades. In fact, from 1999 to 2002, there were over 150 attacks on
electric power systems across the world [3]. N-1 and N-2 security criteria [4] are employed by
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to ensure the normal operations
of power grids under one or two disruptions. Unfortunately, power grids are exposed to both
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unintentional random failures and terrorist attacks [5]. Hence, simultaneous out-of-service
components in a system are not limited to 2. Consequently, N-1 and N-2 criteria are not
suﬃcient to guarantee the security of a power grid under multiple contingencies [4, 6].
Power grid interdiction problem is introduced to identify the set of contingencies that
make a power grid most vulnerable. Salmeron et al. [7] formulate a power grid interdic-
tion problem as a max-min bi-level program, or an attacker-defender (AD) game theoret-
ical model, and solve the problem by global Benders decomposition algorithm [8]. It is
noted that the system performance under the worst N-1 or N-2 scenarios can be computed
through limiting the number of transmission lines under attack to be one or two. Hence,
this attacker-defender model provides a framework to perform analysis with the general N-
k criterion. Motto et al. [9] transform the bi-level program to an equivalent single-level
mixed integer program through dualizing the lower level liner programming problem, and
solve the mixed-integer program using available solvers. Zhao and Zeng [10] exactly solve an
attacker-defender model with transmission line switching as a mitigation operation. In these
models, two diﬀerent agents, an attacker and a defender optimize their respective objective
functions. The attacker, which is the leader in this game and could be a group of terrorists or
a natural disaster, seeks to maximize the power grid disruption (penalty in terms of unmet
demand or load shed [11]) given limited attacking resources. The defender, i.e., the power
grid operator who acts as the follower, reacts after the attack with the goal of minimizing
the power grid disruption by re-dispatch. However, even though attacker-defender models
are useful in obtaining a set of most critical components for a power grid, protecting those
6
critical components does not necessarily provide the best protection plan against system
disruptions as discussed in [11, 12].
In order to determine an optimal power grid protection plan, Brown et al. [13] pro-
pose to extend the bi-level attacker-defender model to a tri-level defender-attacker-defender
(DAD) model. As presented in [12–15], a defender-attacker-defender game theoretical model
involves three agents acting sequentially:  i the defender’s protection: the system planner or
defender identiﬁes power system components to be protected or hardened;  ii the attacker’s
disruption: an attacker disrupts the power grid by forcing the critical system components
out of service; and  iii the system operator’s mitigation: the operator reacts to the disrup-
tive actions to minimize overall damage by manipulating the power grid components. Both
Brown et al. [11] and Yao et al. [12] argue that a tri-level defender-attacker-defender model
produces a superior protection plan because it considers an additional level of interaction
between the defender and the attacker, and selects the best strategy overall. In fact, the
cost of protection plan from an attacker-defender model is 28 percent higher than that of the
optimal protection plan from a defender-attacker-defender model for a particular power grid
instance in [11]. By introducing an extra level of defender to the model, a defender-attacker-
defender model allows the defender to evaluate the impact of varying the defensive resources
budget by doing sensitivity analysis that could not be completed by an attacker-defender
model alone [12].
Brown et al. [11] initially formulate the optimal allocation of defensive resources prob-
lem in a power grid as a defender-attacker-defender model to determine the most critical
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network components to be protected against terrorist attacks. Results on some particular
instances show that adopting a protection plan based on the optimal interdiction solution
from an attacker-defender model would result in a substantial misuse of defensive resources
[11]. Yao et al. [12] study a similar tri-level optimization model and describe a decomposi-
tion approach that solves smaller bi-level problems iteratively. This approach is actually an
extension of set covering decomposition discussed by Israreli and Wood [16]. It is observed
from a set of numerical studies that the method in [12] is time-consuming. Delgadillo et al.
[15] develop an improved algorithm, the implicit enumeration algorithm, which is within a
branch and bound framework, to solve this tri-level programming problem. Their implicit
enumeration algorithm is computationally more eﬃcient than the method developed in [12].
However, it may not be eﬃcient to deal with instances with multiple attacks and protection
decisions. To reduce the computational burden for this type of problems, Bier et al. [14]
propose a simple and inexpensive algorithm that iteratively applies Max Line interdiction
algorithm to sequentially identify a promising hardening or interdiction operation. Although
this approach determines suboptimal solutions, the computational diﬃculty is reduced re-
markably.
To analytically solve this challenging power grid defender-attacker-defender model, it
is necessary to develop an eﬃcient and exact computing method. We adopt a recent general
solution strategy for two-stage robust optimization problems, the column-and-constraint
generation (CCG) method, to develop an eﬃcient algorithm to compute optimal defensive
resources allocation plans. Our study has the following major contributions:
8
 i The developed algorithm identiﬁes optimal solutions in a reasonable time, which signiﬁ-
cantly outperforms other existing exact algorithms. Indeed, our algorithm is, to the best
of our knowledge, the ﬁrst algorithm that can eﬃciently solve a power grid defender-
attacker-defender problem on practical instances.
 ii Numerical results indicate that a protection plan, if obtained in an optimal manner,
can improve the grid survivability with much less load shed, i.e., optimal protection will
always have positive impacts in practice.
 iii Benchmark results of optimal protection plans with respect to those derived by a heuristic
procedure and by an attacker-defender model demonstrate the superior performance of
optimal protection plans from the defender-attacker-defender model in improving grid
survivability.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.3, we present the tri-level formulation
of a defender-attacker-defender model for power grid defensive resources allocation problem.
Section 2.4 describes the proposed solution algorithm. Section 2.5 summarizes the relevant
numerical results. Finally, a conclusion is provided in Section 2.6.
2.3 Problem Formulation
In this section, we present a tri-level min-max-min formulation for a defender-attacker-
defender model for power grid protection on transmission network. Following the convention
in [14, 15] etc., we assume that transmission lines are the only components that can be
protected or disrupted. Attacks on other components of the transmission system can be
modeled according.
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Table 1: Nomenclature used in Chapter 2
N set of indices of buses, indexed by n
J set of indices of generators, indexed by j
Jn set of indices of generators connected to bus n
L set of indices of transmission assets, indexed by l
o l origin bus of transmission asset l
d l destination bus of transmission asset l
S budget of attacker on out-of-service transmission assets
R budget of defender’s protection decision
Dn demand at bus n (in megawatts)
Gj generation capacity of generator j (in megawatts)
Pl power ﬂow capacity of transmission line l (in megawatts)
xl reactance at line l (Ω)
δ¯ phase angle capacity of connecting bus (rad)
zl binary protection decision, 1 if l is protected, and 0 otherwise
vl binary attack decision, 0 if line l is attacked, and 1 otherwise
dn load shed at node n (in megawatts)
δn phase angle at node n (rad)
gj generation level of generator j (in megawatts)
pl power ﬂow on line l (in megawatts)
As described in Section 2.2, a tri-level defender-attacker-defender model involves three
agents acting sequentially. The top level decisions corresponds to the defender’s decisions on
allocating defensive resources to protect transmission lines throughout a power grid before
any attack is observed. The middle level decisions are made by the terrorist attacker, who
seeks to maximize the damage in terms of total load shed of the power system by discon-
necting a set of transmission lines. Then, after the disruption by the attacker is observed,
the system operator reacts to that disruption by solving an optimal power ﬂow problem to
minimize the load shed. The middle-lower level is a typical bi-level power grid interdiction
problem. Similar to [11, 12, 14, 15], the optimal power ﬂow problem in the lower level is
modeled as a DC optimal power ﬂow model. In the remainder of this chapter, .ˆ denotes a
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ﬁxed decision variable. The formulation of the power grid defender-attacker-defender model
is deﬁned in the ﬂowing (2.1)-(2.10).
min
z Z
max
v V
min
pl,gj ,dn,δn
 
n N
dn (2.1)
st.
 
l L
zl   R (2.2)
 
l L
1 vl   S (2.3)
plxl  zl  vl  zlvlδol  δdl, 	l 
 L (2.4)
 
j Jn
gj 
 
loln
pl 
 
ldln
pl  dn  Dn, 	n 
 N (2.5)
Pl   pl   Pl, 	l 
 L (2.6)
δ   δn   δ, 	n 
 N (2.7)
0   gj   Gj, 	j 
 J (2.8)
0   dn   Dn, 	n 
 N (2.9)
vl, zl 
 0, 1, 	l 
 L (2.10)
where Z  

l L zl   R, zl 
 0, 1, 	l 
 L is defender’s protection decision set and V 


l L1  vl   S, vl 
 0, 1, 	l 
 L is attacker’s attack decision set. R is the cardinality
budget for the defender, which means that the defender could protect up to R transmission
lines in a power grid. Similarly, S is the cardinality budget for the attacker so that the
attacker can remove up to S transmission lines. Constraints (2.4) capture the active DC
power ﬂows on a power grid following the Kirchhoﬀ’s Laws with additional protection and
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attack decision variables. If line l is protected by the defender, zl will be set to 1, and then
zl   vl  zlvl  1. Hence, this line will be invulnerable from any attack. If line l is not
protected in advance, zl will be set to 0, which means zl   vl  zlvl  vl. Then, this line will
be subject to attacker’s decision during interdiction. Speciﬁcally, if vl  0, i.e., transmission
line l is attacked, then the power ﬂow pl will be zero. Constraints (2.5) preserve power
balance at bus n such that the inﬂow and outﬂow are equal. Constraints (2.6) simply state
that the power ﬂow on line l will be restricted within Pl, Pl. Similarly, constraints (2.7)
restrict the phase angle of bus n to be within δ, δ. Constraints (2.8) bound the power
generation of each generator by zero and its capacity. Constraints (2.9) guarantee that the
load shed at load bus n do not exceed its nominal demand level and is always nonnegative.
2.4 Solution Methodology
In this section, we describe in details of our customization of the column-and-constraint
generation algorithm (CCG) [17] to solve the power grid defender-attacker-defender problem
deﬁned in Section 2.3. We refer readers to [17] for a complete proof that the CCG algorithm
converges to an optimal solution in ﬁnite steps.
The CCG algorithm is implemented at two levels, i.e., a master problem (MP) and a
subproblem (SP). On the one hand, the master problem, which includes a subset of possible
attacks, yields a lower bound and a protection plan to the defender-attacker-defender prob-
lem. On the other hand, the subproblem, which generates the worst attack plan for a given
protection decision, leads to an upper bound. Clearly, when these two bounds merge, we
obtain an optimal solution.
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2.4.1 Master Problem
Given a set of attack plans Vˆ   vˆ1, . . . , vˆk  V, we construct and solve MP to obtain
a protection plan. Note that, for a particular attack vˆi (vˆi   vˆil , l  L), we deﬁne a set
of dispatch variables pi,gi,di, δk. Then, MP can be constructed as follows.
min
z Z
α (2.11)
st. α 	
 
n N
din, i   1, ..., k (2.12)
 
l L
zl 
 R (2.13)
pilxl   zl  vˆl
i  zlvˆl
iδiol  δ
i
dl, l  L, i   1, ..., k (2.14)
 
j Jn
gij 
 
loln
pil 
 
ldln
pil  d
i
n   Dn, n  N, i   1, ..., k (2.15)
Pl 
 p
i
l 
 Pl, l  L, i   1, ..., k (2.16)
0 
 gij 
 Gj, j  J, i   1, ..., k (2.17)
0 
 din 
 Dn, n  N, i   1, ..., k (2.18)
δ 
 δin 
 δ, n  N, i   1, ..., k (2.19)
zl  0, 1, l  L. (2.20)
Note that the constraints (2.14) are nonlinear constraints. By adopting the big-M
method, we can easily linearize these coonstraints. Speciﬁcally, let M be a suﬃciently large
real number. For any attack scenario vˆi, we partition the set of transmission lines into two
subsets: attacked lines Liα and lines without attack L
i
β, where L
i
α   lvˆ
i
l   0, l  L and
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Liβ   lvˆ
i
l   1, l  L. For the attacked transmission lines (l  L
i
α), (2.14) are replaced by a
set of following constraints:
pilxl  δ
i
o l  δ
i
d l 	 M
1 zl, l  L
i
α (2.21)
pilxl  δ
i
o l  δ
i
d l  M
zl  1, l  L
i
α (2.22)
Plzl 	 p
i
l 	 Plzl, l  L
i
α. (2.23)
For the lines without attack (l  Liβ), (2.14) are replaced by p
i
lxl   δ
i
o lδ
i
d l, l  L
i
β.
As a result, MP, which is a single level mixed-integer programming problem, can be readily
solved by a professional mixed-integer programming (MIP) solver. We point it out that
because Vˆ is a subset of V, compared to the complete defender-attacker-defender model
formation in (2.1)-(2.9), MP is a relaxation and, therefore, provides a lower bound value.
2.4.2 Subproblem
Subproblem serves the function to identify the worst-case attack plan for a given pro-
tection decision. Hence, given protection plan zˆ, where zˆ   zˆl   0 or 1, l  L, the corre-
sponding subproblem is the following bi-level max-min problem.
max
vV
min
pl,gj ,dn,δn
 
nN
dn (2.24)
st.
 
lL

1 vl 	 S (2.25)
plxl  
zˆl  vl  zˆlvlδo l  δd l   0, l  L (2.26)
Pl 	 pl 	 Pl, l  L (2.27)
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 j Jn
gj  
 
loln
pl 
 
ldln
pl  dn  Dn, n  N (2.28)
0  gj  Gj, j  J (2.29)
0  dn  Dn, n  N (2.30)
 δ  δn  δ, n  N (2.31)
vl  0, 1, l  L. (2.32)
Based on a given protection plan zˆ, the transmission lines can be divided into two
subsets: unprotected lines La and protected lines Lb, where La  l	zˆl  0, l  L and
Lb  l	zˆl  1, l  L. For the unprotected lines in La, (2.26) and (2.27) are replaced by a
set of constraints (2.33)-(2.35):
plxl   
δol   δdl  M1  vl, l  La (2.33)
plxl   
δol   δdl  Mvl   1, l  La (2.34)
 Plvl  pl  Plvl, l  La. (2.35)
For the protected lines in Lb, (2.26) and (2.27) are replaced by the following constraints
(2.36)-(2.37):
plxl  δol   δdl, l  Lb (2.36)
 Pl  pl  Pl, l  Lb. (2.37)
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Since the lower level problem of subproblem is a single level minimization linear pro-
gram and always feasible for any attack, through strong duality, we obtain a single level
maximization problem (2.38)-(2.50). In the following formulation (2.38)-(2.50), λn is the
dual variable for (2.28), γj is the dual variable for (2.29), αn is the dual variable for (2.30),
ξn and χn are the dual variables for (2.31), βl and τl are the dual variables for (2.33) and
(2.34), θl and ρl are dual variables for (2.35), μl is the dual variable for (2.36), φl and ϕl are
the dual variables for (2.37).
max
 
l Lb
Pl φl  ϕl 
 
l La
M 1 vl βl  τl

 
j J
Gjγj 
 
n N
δ ξn  χn 
 
n N
Dnαn 
 
l La
Pl θl  ρlvl (2.38)
st.
 
l L
 1 vl  S (2.39)
μl  φl  ϕl  λnoln  λndln  0, l  Lb (2.40)
βl  τl  θl  ρl  λnoln  λndln  0, l  La (2.41)
γj  λnj Jn  0, j  J (2.42)
 
l Lb,dln
μl 
 
l Lb,oln
μl 
 
l La,oln
 βl  τl 
 
l La,dln
 βl  τl
 χn  ξnxl  0, n  N (2.43)
λn  αn  1, n  N (2.44)
vl  	0, 1
, l  L (2.45)
γj  0, j  J (2.46)
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ξn   0, αn   0, n  N (2.47)
χn  0, λn free, n  N (2.48)
βl   0, θl   0, τl  0, ρl  0, l  La (2.49)
μl free, φl   0, ϕl  0, l  Lb (2.50)
Again, since vl is a binary variable, linearization of the nonlinear terms in (2.38) can
be obtained by using the big-M method. Thus, we obtain the linearized formulation of SP.
Hence, subproblem can also be solved by a professional MIP solver.
2.4.3 Algorithm Implementation
Next, we present the implementation steps of our CCG algorithm as demonstrated in
Algorithm 1. The optimality tolerance gap of our algorithm is .
2.5 Computational Study
We apply our method to the IEEE one-area RTS-1996 system [18]. This system consists
of 24 buses, 38 lines, 32 generators, and 17 loads, as illustrated in Figure 1. Circuits sharing
the same towers are treated as independent lines. The algorithm is implemented with CPLEX
12.4 in C++ on top of an Intel dual core 3.00GHz, 4GB memory PC. The optimality tolerance
gap  is set at 0.1%. As an example, an optimal solution for the defender-attacker-defender
model with protection budget R  2 and attack budget S  3 is illustrated in Figure 1.
The best protection plan, in this case, is to protect transmission line 14-16 and 16-17. We
present the optimal load shed vaules and computational time for all instances with attack
budget S  1 to 12 and protection budget R  0 to 4 in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively.
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Algorithm 1 : Algorithm Implementation for DAD
1: Initialization: set the lower bound LB   , the upper bound UB   , and the set of
attack plan Vˆ to be empty with iteration index k   1.
2: while gap   do
3: Solve MP (2.11)-(2.20), obtain its optimal value objMP and a protection decision zˆ,
and update LB with objMP .
4: Solve subproblem(2.38)-(2.50), obtain its optimal value objSP and an optimal attack
vˆk. Then, update UB   minUB, objSP , add vˆk to Vˆ, create dispatch variables
pk,gk,dk, δk, and add the following constraints to MP:
α 
 
n N
dkn
pkl xl  	δ
k
ol  δ
k
dl
  M1 zl, l  L
k
α (2.51)
pkl xl  	δ
k
ol  δ
k
dl
  Mzl  1, l  L
k
α (2.52)
Plzl  p
k
l  Plzl, l  L
k
α (2.53)
pkl xl   δ
k
ol  δ
k
dl, l  L
k
β (2.54)
Pl  p
k
l  Pl, l  L
k
β (2.55) 
j Jn
gkj 
 
loln
pkl 
 
ldln
pkl  d
k
n   Dn, n  N (2.56)
0  gkj  Gj, j  J (2.57)
0  dkn  Dn, n  N (2.58)
δ  δkn  δ, n  N. (2.59)
5: update gap UB  LBLB, k  k  1.
6: end while
7: return z  zˆ. 
As can be seen from Table 2, for each column of Table 2, the load shed is non-decreasing
with the increase of attack budget S. Indeed, this observation reveals that the attacker could
cause more damage to a power grid with more available attacking resources . For each row
in the same table, the load shed is non-increasing with an increasing protection budget R
except for the cases with anticipated attack budget to be 1, i.e., S   1. This observation
reveals that adding defensive resources will improve power grid survivability during attacks.
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Bus 14 Bus 13
Bus 19 Bus 20
Bus 23
Synch.
Cond.
Lines attacked
Lines protected
Figure 1: Reliability test system and a solution
2.5.1 Computational Eﬃciency
Our algorithm demonstrates a superior computational performance over the other exact
algorithm in [15], especially for complicated cases, i.e., those with the relatively larger attack
or protection budgets. Figure 2 presents the computational time (averaged over R from 0 to
4) of our algorithm compared with those made by the implicit enumeration method in [15],
which are generated on a Sun Fire X4140 X64 with 2 processors at 2.3 GHz and 8GB RAM
using MATLAB/CPLEX 11.0 under GAMS. Note that the computation time of the implicit
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Table 2: Load shed (MW) for an IEEE system
S R   0 R   1 R   2 R   3 R   4
1 0 0 0 0 0
2 194 151 136 118 118
3 618 571 422 377 266
4 922 733 618 571 492
5 1037 843 733 673 571
6 1057 969 788 731 676
7 1278 1057 898 808 761
8 1393 1265 1013 885 770
9 1413 1285 1013 885 825
10 1448 1320 1068 940 849
11 1468 1340 1103 975 927
12 1532 1404 1218 1052 927
enumeration method increases almost exponentially to over 2000 seconds with the budget of
interdicted lines (S) from 1 to 12. On the contrary, the computation time of column-and-
constraint generation algorithm increases at a much slower rate and is much less sensitive to
attack budget S.
2.5.2 Eﬀectiveness of Optimal Protection
To investigate the eﬀectiveness of allocating defensive resources based on the defender-
attacker-defender model, we conduct experiments with diﬀerent protection and attack bud-
gets. Figure 3 presents the load shed of the power grid under diﬀerent protection and attack
budgets. Note that, as a general rule, the beneﬁt of protecting transmission assets is always
positive. When the attack budget S is small, e.g., less than 2 lines are attacked, such a
beneﬁt may not be large, which concurs an observation made in Bier et al. [14] that pro-
tection may not be cost-eﬀective. However, when S becomes larger, e.g., S  3, the beneﬁt
of protection becomes very signiﬁcant. Indeed, when the protection budget R is set to 2,
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Table 3: Computation time (second) for an IEEE system
S R   0 R   1 R   2 R   3 R   4
1 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.25
2 0.45 0.75 1.13 1.54 2.36
3 0.75 1.40 2.67 3.30 5.45
4 1.61 2.52 5.47 10.19 7.29
5 5.50 8.76 17.98 21.40 40.83
6 11.25 20.52 28.69 65.50 88.25
7 16.69 28.32 75.07 113.97 246.82
8 10.09 36.19 74.30 191.33 108.11
9 32.73 84.33 154.69 196.03 632.63
10 10.99 44.34 69.01 199.20 517.46
11 24.79 53.11 157.64 243.46 423.58
12 12.65 16.60 59.99 144.23 323.68
Table 4: Comparison between AD and DAD
No protection AD DAD (R=S)
load shed protected load shed protected load shed
S (MW) lines (MW) lines (MW)
1 0 None 0 None 0
11-14, 14-16,
2 194 14-16 151 17-22 136
15-21A, 13-23,
3 618 15-21B,16-17 571 14-16,16-17 377
3-24,12-23, 12-23,14-16,
4 922 13-23,14-16 733 16-17,17-22 492
i.e., up to two lines can be protected, it is typical that more than 25% of load shed can be
reduced under various attack scenarios. When the protection budget rises up to 4, the total
load shed reduction can be as much as 57%.
In an empirical study of their fast hardening method, Bier et al. [14] note that harden-
ing, i.e., protection, could have a negative impact on the system. They believe it is probably
due to the non-optimal nature of the Max Line interdiction algorithm, which is a subroutine
used to derive attack and hardening decisions and to evaluate the hardening solutions. By
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Figure 2: Comparison of computational time
benchmark the hardening solutions with optimal protection plans, we believe that it can
identify the true reason behind and assess the performance of the hardening method.
We implement the hardening method and evaluate the hardening solutions by the Max
Line interdiction algorithm [14]. Results are represented by dashed lines in Figure 4 where
protection budget is set as 2 and 4, respectively. H2 and H4 stand for the results with 2 lines
and 4 lines hardened respectively, obtained by setting the Max Line interdiction iteration
limit to 15, the hardening iteration to 1 and 2, respectively, and the hardening batch size
to 2 [14]. As can be seen in Figure 4, if attack budget S equals to 4 (or 5 or 6), load
sheds of H4 are more than those of H2, whereas H4 has 4 lines protected and H2 only has
2 lines protected. Such a result indicates that hardening could have a negative impact by
incurring more load shed. However, if optimal attack plans are used for evaluation, whose
results are represented by solid lines in Figure 4, we observe that hardening does not cause
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Figure 3: Load shed with diﬀerent protection budgets
a negative impact under any attack scenario and it actually reduces load sheds in general.
Hence, because of the non-optimal nature of the Max Line interdiction algorithm, it can
not provide a proper evaluation to justify the quality of hardening solutions. This result
conﬁrms the conjecture in [14] that the heuristic nature of that algorithm could lead to the
incorrect conclusion. Figure 5 presents the load shed of hardening solutions H2 and H4
(under optimal attack plans) and those of optimal protection plans with the same protection
budgets. Clearly, although hardening solutions help to improve power grid survivability,
they are signiﬁcantly less eﬀective compared to optimal protection plans. Especially, when
the attack budget S is large, protection by a hardening solution could cause the grid to carry
almost 70% more total load shed than that by an optimal one.
2.5.3 Attacker-Defender versus Defender-Attacker-Defender
It is mentioned in [11] and [12] that, with the same protection budget, a protection
plan based on a defender-attacker-defender model is more eﬀective than that of an attacker-
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Figure 4: Performance of another hardening method
defender model when a system is under contingency. To verify this observation, we conduct
a study to compare the protection plans from the attacker-defender model and the defender-
attacker-defender model. The attacker-defender model is obtained by setting protection
budget to zero and ﬁxing all protection variables to zero in formulation (2.1)-(2.9). System
load sheds of no protection and of diﬀerent protection plans are computed under worst-
case interdiction with attack budget S from 1 to 4. Speciﬁcally, load shed of no protection
scenario is obtained from the attacker-defender model directly. The protection plan from the
attacker-defender model is the set of transmission lines in the most destructive interdiction
plan, which is the optimal solution of the attacker-defender model. After forcing those critical
components to be protected, we solve the attacker-defender model again to obtain load shed.
The load shed of optimal protection plans is simply obtained by solving the defender-attacker-
defender model with R   S. Table 4 presents the protection plans and load shed. As can
be seen, even though both the attacker-defender model and the defender-attacker-defender
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Figure 5: Comparison between solutions
model improve power grid survivability by reducing the system load shed under contingency,
the attacker-defender model fails to derive the optimal protection plan and leads to more total
load shed than that of the defender-attacker-defender model. Actually, the protection plans
from the attacker-defender model could cause 50% more load shed, compared to the optimal
protection plans from the defender-attacker-defender model. This result not only conﬁrms
the observations made by Brown et al. [11] and Yao et al. [12], but also further highlights the
drastic diﬀerence between the attacker-defender model and the defender-attacker-defender
model. In fact, based on results in Table 4, as well as Figure 4-5, we provide the following
remarks. First of all, if we do not have the capability to identify most destructive attack
plans of an attacker, neither can we properly evaluate or derive eﬀective protection plans.
Secondly, an exact protection plan from the defender-attacker-defender model demonstrates
superior performance with much less load shed, compared to those derived by heuristic
methods or the attacker-defender model.
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Hence, given that huge economic losses and serious infrastructure damages will be
incurred under a power grid disruption, it is of a particular value to apply defender-attacker-
defender model and solutions in system planning and operations.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter presents a new approach to solve a power grid defender-attacker-defender
model. The proposed column-and-constraint generation algorithm ﬁnds the optimal protec-
tion plan within acceptable computational time, which signiﬁcantly outperforms the existing
exact solution method. Case studies on the IEEE one-area RTS-1996 system have been done
to verify the eﬀectiveness of optimally allocating defensive resources to hedge against terrorist
attacks.
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CHAPTER 3: DEFENDER-ATTACKER-DEFENDER MODEL WITH
NETWORK TOPOLOGY CONTROL
3.1 Background
Power system vulnerability is a serious concern to power industry and the whole society.
Terrorists and natural disasters’ attacks on power grids are regarded as a national threat due
to their massive damage. A recent report released by National Research Council emphasizes
that a terrorist attack on U.S. power grids could be much more destructive than Hurricane
Sandy because it could black out large segments of the country for months, cause hundreds
of billions of economic damage, and lead to thousands of deaths [2]. Hence, protecting or
hardening grid components against various disruptions is of a high national interest [19, 20].
Moreover, [21] clearly states that energy security eﬀorts should start with hardening power
grids.
To derive an eﬀective plan that protects critical components with limited defensive
resources, researchers often adopt game theory models to simulate the interaction between
system operators and terrorists/natural disasters. Among them, defender-attacker-defender
models are probably the most popular ones [1, 12–14, 22]. In those DAD models, system
operators protect or harden grid components before any possible attack. Then, given the grid
with some components non-attackable, attackers seek to destroy other critical components
with the maximized total load shed. Once the attack happens, system operators respond
27
to the disruptions by taking mitigation operations, for example, re-dispatching power ﬂows,
to minimize the load shed. Because those models are challenging tri-level mixed-integer
programming problems, many research eﬀorts focus on developing fast algorithms to solve
practical instances. Examples include heuristic methods [11, 14] and exact algorithms [1, 22].
According to [1], it is critical to understand and model the defender’s mitigation ca-
pability as it aﬀects the attacker’s attacking targets. Without a full description of the
attacker’s behaviors, the optimality of the protection plan will be forfeited. Nevertheless,
to the best of our knowledge, all existing research on power grid defender-attacker-defender
models neglect one important mitigation operation: transmission line switching (also known
as topology control).
In fact, given that expanding transmission infrastructure is very costly and could pose
many integration issues to existing power grids, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC) orders call for improved economic operations of the electric transmission net-
work. Especially, those orders promote the use of transmission line switching, which changes
the transmission network topology, to improve utilization of existing transmission systems.
Actually, transmission line switching has been included in real operations as a corrective
mechanism to alleviate line overloads and voltage violations after contingencies [23–26]. For
example, PJM has incorporated the post-contingency transmission line switching actions
into its Special Protection Schemes (SPSs) [27], which reﬂects a shift from the preventive
approach to a more economic corrective approach. The ISO New England studies the dis-
patch eﬃciency along with reliability requirements to determine the optimal periods to take
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oﬀ transmission lines for maintenance and earns a saving of 72.5 million dollars in 2008 [27].
Based on these current industry practices, it is believed that transmission line switching
should be deeply investigated and eﬀectively utilized.
To analytically study transmission line switching operations, [28] considers the optimal
transmission line switching problem by introducing transmission line switching decision into
a DC optimal power ﬂow model. According to [28], a saving of 25% in dispatch costs can
be achieved from transmission line switching. Recent work [29] also reveals the signiﬁcant
beneﬁts of transmission line switching in utilizing wind power. Transmission line switching is
also introduced to power system vulnerability analysis as system operator’s post-contingency
operations [5, 10, 30]. Given that transmission line switching can greatly improve dispatch
capability of a power system, in this chapter, we consider protection operations and trans-
mission line switching decisions under the defender-attacker-defender model. We expect to
derive cost-eﬀective protection plans that can better use limited defensive resources.
However, the challenge from incorporating transmission line switching is not only re-
ﬂected in how to model this operation in the defender-attacker-defender framework, but also
in how to solve the new model. All existing algorithms for general defender-attacker-defender
models depend on the strong duality of the inner most linear programming problem, which
is not the case when binary transmission line switching decisions are included. To address
this challenge, we adopt the nested column-and-constraint generation (NCCG) algorithm
[31] that extends the basic column-and-constraint method and is designed speciﬁcally to
deal with the tri-level problem with an inner most mixed-integer problem.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we give the formulation
of the defender-attacker-defender model with transmission line switching as post-contingency
operations (i.e., DAD-TLS formulation) and present some structural properties. Section 3.3
describes the customized nested column-and-constraint generation algorithm to solve DAD-
TLS formulation. Section 3.4 shows our computational results. In Section 3.5, we analyze
the beneﬁts from introducing transmission line switching operations to hardening decisions.
Section 3.6 concludes with a discussion.
3.2 Problem Formulation
In this section, we present a tri-level min-max-min formulation of a defender-attacker-
defender model for power grid protection problem that includes transmission line switching
as a mitigation strategy. Similar formulations without transmission line switching can be
found in [1, 12, 15].
3.2.1 Modeling Protection, Attack, and Transmission Switching
A study in [28] initially formulates transmission line switching operation into a DC
optimal power ﬂow model to enable the system operators change the topology of transmis-
sion network. Transmission line switching is represented by a binary variable, which takes
eﬀect on the Kirchhoﬀ’s law constraints. Similarly, our study considers transmission line
switching as a corrective post-contingency/attack operation and employs binary transmis-
sion line switching variables in the inner DC optimal power ﬂow model. This will allow the
operator to modify the transmission system network topology along with the power ﬂow
related variables. Speciﬁcally, each transmission line l is associated with a binary variable
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Table 5: Nomenclature used in Chapter 3
N set of indices of buses
J set of indices of generators
L set of indices of transmission lines
j generator index, j   J
l transmission line index, l   L
n bus index, n   N
Jn set of indices of generators connected to bus n
ol origin bus of transmission line l
dl destination bus of transmission line l
Z defender’s protection decision set
V attacker’s attack decision set
K budget for attacker’s disruption
R budget for defender’s protection
xl reactance at line l
Dn demand at bus n
Gj generation capacity of generator j
Pl power ﬂow capacity of transmission line l
zl protection decision, 1 for protected, 0 otherwise
vl attack decision, 0 for attacked, 1 otherwise
wl transmission line switching, 0 for switched oﬀ, 1 otherwise
dn load shed at node n
δn phase angle at node n
gj generation level of generatorj
pl power ﬂow on line l
z vector of zl, l   L, a protection plan
v vector of vl, l   L, an attack plan
w vector of wl, l   L, a transmission line switching plan
ˆ ﬁxed decision variable (or vector) of 
wl that represents whether a line is included in the system (wl  1) or disconnected (i.e.,
transmission line is switched oﬀ and wl  0). Hence, the Kirchhoﬀ’s law constraints in
the defender-attacker-defender model with transmission line switching can be formulated as
equation (3.1).
plxl  wlzl  vl  zlvl	δo l  δd l
, l   L (3.1)
31
In (3.1),  zl  vl  zlvl represents the logic of protection (zl) and attack (vl) decisions.
If zl  1, line l is protected, then no attack on that line would be possible since zlvlzlvl 
zl  1. Note that if a transmission line is out-of-service after an attack, it must be non-
protected (zˆl  0) and attacked (vˆl  0), which means zl  vl  zlvl  0, and power ﬂow pl
is zero. If a transmission line is not attacked (vˆl  1), (3.1) reduces to plxl  wlδo l  δd l.
Thus, transmission variable wl will take eﬀect on the transmission line.
3.2.2 Defender-Attacker-Defender with Transmission Switching
The tri-level defender-attacker-defender model involves three agents acting sequentially.
The top level corresponds to the defender’s decision on allocating defensive resources to pro-
tect transmission lines throughout a power grid. The middle level decisions are controlled by
an attacker, who seeks to maximize the total load shed of the power system by disconnecting
a set of transmission lines that are unprotected. Then, after the disruption by the attacker
is observed, the system operator reacts to that disruption by solving an optimal power ﬂow
problem with transmission line switching as a network topology control method to minimize
the total load shed. Hence, the inner most problem is a mixed-integer program. It diﬀers
from those in [1, 11, 12, 14, 15, 32] where the inner most level is simply a linear program for
linear DC optimal power ﬂow.
The mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) formulation of the defender-attacker-
defender model with transmission line switching (DAD-TLS) is:
min
zZ
max
vV
min
wl,pl,gj ,dn,δn
 
nN
dn (3.2)
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st.
 
l L
zl   R (3.3)
 
l L
1 vl   K (3.4)
plxl  wlzl  vl  zlvlδol  δdl, 	l 
 L (3.5)
 
j Jn
gj 
 
loln
pl 
 
ldln
pl  dn  Dn, 	n 
 N (3.6)
Pl   pl   Pl, 	l 
 L (3.7)
0   gj   Gj, 	j 
 J (3.8)
0   dn   Dn, 	n 
 N (3.9)
vl, zl, wl 
 0, 1, 	l 
 L (3.10)
where Z  
 
l L zl   R, zl 
 0, 1, 	l 
 L is defender’s protection decision set, and V 

 
l L1  vl   K, vl 
 0, 1, 	l 
 L is attacker’s attack decision set. R is the cardinality
budget for the defender, which means the defender can protect up to R transmission lines.
Similarly, K is the cardinality budget for the attacker so that the attacker can remove
up to K transmission lines. Note that it is consistent with N -K reliability consideration.
Constraints (3.5) capture the active DC power ﬂows on a power grid following the Kirchhoﬀ’s
Law with protection, attack, and transmission line switching decision variables. Constraints
(3.6) preserve power ﬂow balance at bus n. Constraints (3.7) simply state that the power ﬂow
on line l will be restricted within Pl, Pl. Constraints (3.8) bound the power generation
of each generator by zero and its capacity. Constraints (3.9) guarantee that the load shed
at load bus n does not exceed its nominal demand and is always nonnegative. Note that,
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because of the binary transmission line switching variables, the inner most optimal power
ﬂow problem with transmission line switching becomes a mixed-integer program. All existing
exact algorithms in solving defender-attacker-defender models, e.g., the implicit enumeration
in [15], the column-and-constraint generation in [1], are no longer applicable as they depends
on the duality theory of linear program.
3.2.3 Structural Properties
In this subsection, we present some insights and properties of DAD-TLS formulation
presented in (3.2-3.10). Let f R,K represents the optimal value for a given hardening budget
R and a given attack budget K. The next result follows easily by analyzing the relaxation
relationship between diﬀerent Rs (and Ks).
Theorem 1 f R,K is non-increasing in R and non-decreasing in K.
Proof: Indeed, it is easy to see that it is only necessary to consider cases where R K  L.
Otherwise, we can reduce K to L  R, given that extra attack eﬀorts are useless. Let
f R,Kzˆ be the optimal value for a given protection plan zˆ and vˆ be its corresponding optimal
attack plan. By an abuse of notation, we also use zˆ (and vˆ, respectively) to represent the
set of associated transmission lines subject to protection (and attack, respectively).
Theorem 2 (Intersection Theorem)
1. zˆ  vˆ  ∅, i.e., an optimal attack plan does not involve any transmission lines under
protection;
2. For a protection plan z0, if z0 vˆ  ∅, we have f R,Kz
0 	 f R,Kzˆ. Therefore, unless
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zˆ is an optimal protection plan to DAD-TLS problem, it is necessary to have z0  vˆ  ∅
if z0 is an improved protection plan over zˆ.
Proof: Note that the ﬁrst statement follows easily. Also, it is suﬃcient to prove the ﬁrst
part of the second statement. So, we have
f R,Kz
0
 max
vV
 
min

nN
dn : (3.4) (3.10), z  z
0


 
min

nN
dn : (3.5) (3.10), z  z
0,v  vˆ

Because zˆ  vˆ  z0   vˆ  ∅, it is easy to see that
 
min

nN
dn : (3.5) (3.10), z  z
0,v  vˆ


 
min

nN
dn : (3.5) (3.10), z  zˆ,v  vˆ

 f R,Kzˆ
Therefore, we have f R,Kz
0  f R,Kzˆ.
3.3 Solution Methodology
In this section, we customize and implement the nested column-and-constraint gener-
ation algorithm in [31] to solve the DAD-TLS. In particular, by extending the inner most
mix integer optimal power ﬂow problem (with transmission line switching) into a bi-level
program, the middle and inner levels’ problem becomes a tri-level problem where the inner
most is a linear program. Then, based on the strong duality, we can further convert that
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tri-level formulation into a max-min-max format. Speciﬁcally, for a given protection plan zˆ,
we have
max
v V
min
wl,pl,gj ,dn,δn
 
n N
dn   max
v V
min
wl
min
pl,gj ,dn,δn
 
n N
dn   max
v V
min
wl
max
π1,...,π6
β
where β is the dual objective function,  π1, π2 are the dual variables for the constraints
(3.5) and (3.6),  π3, π4 are the dual variables for constraints (3.7), π5 is the dual variable
for constraints (3.8) and π6 is the dual variable for constraints(3.9). Given this max-min-
max problem, we can solve it by the column-and-constraint generation algorithm to derive
the optimal attack plan v. Then, with the v, we can again make use of the column-and-
constraint generation algorithm to solve the complete defender-attacker-defender model in
(3.2-3.10).
Therefore, the column-and-constraint method is used in two levels, for which the whole
procedure is called nested column-and-constraint method. To distinguish the master prob-
lems and sub problems of those two levels, we denote the master problem of outer level as
NCCG master problem, the inner level master problem as CCG master problem, and the
inner level subproblem as CCG subproblem.
3.3.1 NCCG Master Problem
In this section, we formulate the master problem for nested column-and-constraint
generation algorithm.
Given a subset of worst-case attack plans Vˆ  vˆ1, . . . , vˆk  V, we construct and solve
the out level Master Problem to obtain a feasible protection plan. Note that, for a particular
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attack plan vˆi (vˆi    vˆil , l  L), we deﬁne a set of dispatch variables p
i,gi,di, δk that
are associated with this particular attack plan. Then, the out level Master Problem can be
constructed as follows.
min α (3.11)
st. α 
 
n N
din, i  1, ..., k (3.12)
 
l L
zl 	 R (3.13)
pilxl  wl
izl 
 vˆl
i  zlvˆl
iδiol  δ
i
dl, l  L, i  1, ..., k (3.14)
 
j Jn
gij 
 
loln
pil 

 
ldln
pil 
 d
i
n  Dn, n  N, i  1, ..., k (3.15)
Pl 	 p
i
l 	 Pl, l  L, i  1, ..., k (3.16)
0 	 gij 	 Gj, j  J, i  1, ..., k (3.17)
0 	 din 	 Dn, n  N, i  1, ..., k (3.18)
zl   0, 1, l  L. (3.19)
To linearize (3.14), we replace it with following constraints.
0 	 ril 	 1, l  L, i  1, ..., k (3.20)
ril 	 w
i
l , l  L, i  1, ..., k (3.21)
ril 	 zl 
 vˆl
i  zlvˆl
i, l  L, i  1, ..., k (3.22)
ril  zl 
 vˆl
i  zlvˆl
i 
 wil  1, l  L, i  1, ..., k (3.23)
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pilxl   δ
i
o l   δ
i
d l  Mp1  r
i
l, l  L, i 	 1, ..., k (3.24)
pilxl   δ
i
o l   δ
i
d l 
 Mpr
i
l   1, l  L, i 	 1, ..., k (3.25)
 Plr
i
l  p
i
l  r
i
lPl, l  L, i 	 1, ..., k. (3.26)
Since Vˆ 	 vˆ1, . . . , vˆk is a subset of all possible attack plans, the out level Master
Problem is a relaxation of the original model. As a relaxation of the original problem, the
out level master problem provides a lower bound.
3.3.2 NCCG Subproblem
Solving the NCCG master problem will also give a feasible protection plan. We for-
mulate the NCCG subproblem to obtain a feasible solution and an upper bound. Given
hardening plan zˆ, zˆ 	 zˆl, l  L, the NCCG subproblem can be formulated as follows.
max
vV
min
wW
 
nN
dn (3.27)
st. plxl   wlzˆl  vl   zˆlvlδo l   δd l 	 0, l  L (3.28)
 
lL
1  vl  K (3.29)
 Pl  pl  Pl, l  L (3.30)
 
jJn
gj  
 
lo ln
pl 
 
ld ln
pl  dn 	 Dn, n  N (3.31)
0  gj  Gj, j  J (3.32)
0  dn  Dn, n  N (3.33)
vl, wl  0, 1, l  L. (3.34)
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Given a protection plan zˆ (a solution from NCCG master problem), and a set of
transmission line switching plans Wˆ    wˆs, s  1, ..., t (solutions from CCG subproblems,
t is the current iteration number of column-and-constraint generation loop), CCG master
problem can be formulated as follows.
max
v V
β (3.35)
s.t. β 
 
n
Dnπ
2
n
s
 π6n
s
 
 
j
Gjπ
3
j
s

 
l
Plπ
4
l
s
 π5l
s
, 	s  1, ..., t (3.36)
 
l L
1 vl  K (3.37)
xlπ
1
l
s
 π2
s
n,oln  π
2s
n,dln  π
4
l
s
 π5l
s
 0, 	l 
 L, s  1, ..., t (3.38)
π2
s
n,j Jn  π
3
j
s
 0, 	j 
 J, s  1, ..., t (3.39)
π2n
s
 π6n
s
 1, 	n 
 N, s  1, ..., t (3.40)

 
l,oln
π1l
s
wˆl
szˆl  vl  zˆlvl 
 
l,dln
π1l
s
wˆl
szˆl  vl  zˆlvl  0,
	n 
 N, s  1, ..., t (3.41)
π1l
s
free, π4l
s
 0, π5l
s
 0, 	l 
 L, s  1, ..., t (3.42)
π2n
s
free, π6n
s
 0, 	n 
 N, s  1, ..., t (3.43)
π3j
s
 0, 	j 
 J, s  1, ..., t (3.44)
vl 
  0, 1, 	l 
 L. (3.45)
Note that the nonlinear constraints in (3.41) cab be easily linearized using the big-M
method. Given a protection plan zˆ (i.e., a solution from NCCG master problem), and an
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attack plan vˆ (i.e., a solution from CCG master problem), the CCG subproblem can be
formulated as follows.
min
w
 
n N
dn (3.46)
st. plxl    zˆl  vˆl  zˆlvˆlwlδol  δdl, l (3.47)
 
j Jn
gj 
 
loln
pl 
 
ldln
pl  dn  Dn, n 	 N (3.48)
Pl 
 pl 
 Pl, l 	 L (3.49)
0 
 gj 
 Gj, j 	 J (3.50)
0 
 dn 
 Dn, n 	 N (3.51)
wl 	 0, 1, l 	 L. (3.52)
3.3.3 Algorithm Implementation
Next, we present the implementation steps of nested column-and-constraint generation
algorithm as in Algorithm 2. Vˆ is a subset of attack plans Vˆ  vˆ1, . . . , vˆk  V for NCCG
master problem, Wˆ is a subset of transmission switching plans Wˆ  wˆ1, . . . , wˆs  W for
CCG master problem. The optimality tolerance gap of algorithm is .
A ﬂowchart of the complete implementation of nested column-and-constraint genera-
tion algorithm is presented in Figure 6. Two loops of CCG based decomposition algorithm
is demonstrated. As NCCG master problem, CCG master and sub problems, after lin-
earization, are linear mixed-integer programs, they can be readily solved by professional
mixed-integer programming solvers. We note that results in Intersection Theorem can help
40
Algorithm 2 : Nested column-and-constraint generation for DAD-TLS
1: Initialization: set LB   , UB   , Vˆ  ∅, iteration index k   1
2: while gap   do
3: solve NCCG master problem, update LB with optimal value objMP , update protec-
tion plan zˆ, and gap
4: solve NCCG sub problem with protection plan zˆ by the Subroutine below, obtain
objective value objSP and attack plan v , UB   minUB, objSP , update gap and
k   k  1
5: add v  to Vˆ, create dispatch variables pk,gk,dk, δk	, and add these variables
(columns) with corresponding constraints to NCCG master problem
6: end while
7: return z    zˆ 
Subroutine : Solving NCCG sub problem
8: Initialization: set LBin   , UBin   , Wˆ  ∅, and inner iteration index s  1
9: while gap
 
  do
10: solve CCG master problem, update UBin with optimal objective value objMPin,
obtain attack plan vˆ, gap
 
11: solve CCG sub problem with attack plan vˆ, obtain optimal value objSPin and an
optimal transmission line switching plan wˆs, update LBin   minLBin, objSPin, s  
s 1, gap
 
12: add wˆs to Wˆ, create dual variables π1s, . . . , π6s	, and add these variables(columns)
and their corresponding constraints to CCG master problem
13: end while
14: return v    vˆ
to reduce the solution space and, therefore, the computational complexity. Speciﬁcally, we
include the following constraints in the CCG master problem formulation (for a given pro-
tection plan zˆ)
vl 
 1,  l  L s.t. zˆl 
 1.
The following constraints are also added to the NCCG master problem (for attack
plans in Vˆ).
 
l:vˆl0
zl  1,  vˆ  Vˆ.
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Figure 6: Flow chart of NCCG algorithm
3.4 Computational Studies
In this section, we conduct computational experiments on a well-known IEEE Relia-
bility Test System (RTS) one-area (1996) [18]. This system consists of 24 buses, 38 lines,
32 generators and 17 loads as illustrated in Fig 7. Data and parameters are adopted from
[5]. The algorithm is implemented in C++ with CPLEX 12.5 on top of an Intel dual core
3.00GHz, 4GB memory PC. Tolerance gap  is 0.1%.
3.4.1 Computational Results
We ﬁrst present the system total load shed and computational time with hardening
budget R ranging from 0 to 4 and attack budget K ranging from 0 to 6. The load shed of
optimal solutions are reported in Table 6 and their computational times are listed in Table 7.
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N -K represents the worst-case contingency withK transmission lines under attack, specially,
N -0 means no contingency in the grid.
Table 6: Load shed (MW) from DAD-TLS
N-K R   0 R   1 R   2 R   3 R   4
N-0 0 0 0 0 0
N-1 131 129 79 73 69
N-2 279 279 259 229 166
N-3 429 390 338 316 246
N-4 538 516 446 396 305
N-5 688 596 501 448 377
N-6 775 648 577 527 442
Table 7: Computational time (second) for DAD-TLS
N-K R   0 R   1 R   2 R   3 R   4
N-0 1.2 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.0
N-1 5.3 7.7 9.1 18.6 36.9
N-2 13.5 15.1 10.5 18.6 67.3
N-3 13.9 54.7 112 183 270
N-4 9.8 93.1 204 788 9268
N-5 4.6 328 20147 12365 42605
N-6 21.1 5116 71989 411123 111039
As expected, we observe in Table 6 that more protection budget R (or more attack
budget K, respectively) leads to less (or more, respectively) load shed. Nevertheless, it can
be seen that neither protection nor attack displays a linear behavior with respect to R or K
in reducing or increasing the load shed, which indicates the complexity of physical laws and
structures of a power grid. On the one hand, an empirical understanding is that a hardening
plan with R   2, if implemented in an optimal way, often leads to signiﬁcant load shed
reductions under diﬀerent attack budgets. On the other hand, a similar understanding is
that the worst N -2 contingencies could be very destructive.
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In Table 7, we observe that for some instances the computation time could be very
long, especially for those considering N -5 and N -6 contingencies, which can be explained
by the combinatorial nature of DAD-TLS model. Because we are dealing with power grid
long-term planning problem, which does not need to work in a real time fashion, such
computational time could be addressed by adopting more powerful computing facilities with
suﬃcient computational budgets. Another strategy is, according to Theorem 1, we can adopt
optimal values from cases withN -K-1 and R-1 as strong bounds to facilitate the computation
of those with N -K and R. Certainly, we will also explore advanced enhancement methods
to improve the computational performance.
Indeed, due to the security or management issues in practice, we may not be able to
switch oﬀ arbitrary transmission lines in the grid. Next, we study a few variants of DAD-
TLS model where switching operations are restricted in diﬀerent ways. For those variants,
computational burdens are drastically reduced. To simplify our exposition, we refer to the
original DAD-TLS with the full switching capability as DAD-OTS (optimal transmission
switching).
3.4.2 A Few Variants of DAD-TLS
3.4.2.1 Budget for Transmission Line Switching
In practice, it is not practical to switch a large number of transmission lines when the
power system is under attack. Consider the extreme case of transmission switching is all
transmission lines are switched oﬀ. Hence, a power grid operator can put a budget on the
number of switched transmission lines in respect of the system safety, which can be translated
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into the following constraint to bound the total number of switching-oﬀs in the inner most
minimization problem,
 
l L
 1 wl  PLS
where PLS denotes the cardinality bound. The computational time and load shed results
are listed in Table 8 and Table 9 with PLS  4. Comparing the computational times in
Table 9 with those in Table 7, we note that the computational time is greatly relieved by
including a budget constraint on the total number of switched transmission lines. In the
meantime, comparing results in Table 8 with those in Table 6, only 6 out of 35 cases incur
slightly higher load shed. Those results suggest that we can achieve a trade-oﬀ between the
load shed reduction and the computational time by assigning PLS to an appropriate value.
Table 8: Load shed (MW) from DAD-TLS with PLS=4
N-K R  0 R  1 R  2 R  3 R  4
N-0 00 0 0 0 0
N-1 135 129 105 73 69
N-2 279 279 264 229 179
N-3 429 390 346 316 246
N-4 538 516 446 396 321
N-5 688 596 501 448 377
N-6 775 648 577 527 442
Table 9: Computational time (second) for DAD-TLS with PLS=4
N-K R  0 R  1 R  2 R  3 R  4
N-0 1.2 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.8
N-1 2.4 3.7 6.7 12.3 28.1
N-2 2.9 3.2 5.1 22.3 124
N-3 9.5 20.5 20.2 103 139
N-4 9.4 14.3 60 170 5637
N-5 5.3 18.2 87.6 529 7297
N-6 7.7 29.5 158 484 971
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3.4.2.2 Candidate Switchable Lines
In this part, we investigate one situation where only a proper subset of transmission
lines are switchable. To achieve system stabilization, we may not want to switch oﬀ transmis-
sion lines that carry a signiﬁcant amount of ﬂow. So, we study one line switching strategy
where only those with the least amount of power ﬂows (measured when a power grid is
in normal operating conditions: no attack/contingency) is switchable. In our experiment,
we only allow the 10 least power ﬂow lines to be switchable and computational results are
reported in Table 10 and Table 11.
Table 10: Load shed (MW) of DAD-TLS
N-K R   0 R   1 R   2 R   3 R   4
N-0 110 110 110 110 110
N-1 197 190 190 172 171
N-2 307 279 278 277 251
N-3 429 411 366 338 316
N-4 538 516 446 402 396
N-5 688 596 501 473 466
N-6 775 648 575 553 525
Table 11: Computational time (second) of DAD-TLS
N-K R   0 R   1 R   2 R   3 R   4
N-0 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3
N-1 0.6 1.2 1.4 3.2 3.3
N-2 1.1 2.4 2.5 3.6 12.6
N-3 2.1 3.2 4.3 12.6 30.0
N-4 3.5 4.0 8.2 47.5 49.4
N-5 4.1 8.2 35.0 55.5 65.1
N-6 6.0 11.3 40.0 146 192
Comparing results in Table 10 and Table 11 with those reported in previous tables, we
note that the computational time is further drastically reduced. However, the performance in
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reducing load shed is not satisfactory, especially for cases with K   3. Such result indicates
that only considering those transmission lines with the least ﬂows as switchable is not very
eﬀective in mitigating contingencies. Other lines, which may carry a signiﬁcant amount
of power ﬂow, could be more eﬀective in post-contingency operations. A similar study is
performed on a set of randomly selected transmission lines as switchable candidates. In Table
12 and 13, load shed and computational times of such candidate set with 10 randomly selected
switchable candidate lines are reported. Similar to those in Table 10, the performance in
reducing load shed is not satisfactory, which again conﬁrms the challenge and the importance
of selecting switchable candidates to mitigate contingencies.
Table 12: Load shed (MW) from DAD-TLS with candidate
N-K R  0 R  1 R  2 R  3 R  4
N-0 50 50 50 50 50
N-1 191 1.59 146 126 122
N-2 299 2.86 285 285 205
N-3 429 4.18 372 316 281
N-4 544 5.16 446 396 346
N-5 688 5.96 511 448 408
N-6 775 6.48 581 527 477
Table 13: Computational time (second) from DAD-TLS with candidate
N-K R  0 R  1 R  2 R  3 R  4
N-0 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8
N-1 2.3 1.6 1.3 3.3 4.0
N-2 3.2 4.0 4.4 5.7 86.1
N-3 2.2 5.5 9.6 20.2 46.3
N-4 11.6 3.5 12.1 38.5 45.7
N-5 2.9 11.0 65.6 48.2 184.3
N-6 7.2 36.3 39.7 303 519.5
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3.5 Beneﬁt Analysis of Transmission Line Switching in Hardening
To investigate the beneﬁts of incorporating transmission network topology control
through optimal transmission line switching into power grid hardening problem, in this sec-
tion, we make a comparison of the hardening plans derived from defender-attacker-defender
model with optimal transmission line switching, i.e., DAD-OTS, and those obtained from
traditional DAD model (without switching) [1].
3.5.1 Hardening Plans from Transmission Line Switching
We ﬁrst demonstrate that with transmission line switching, an optimal protection plan
derived from DAD-OTS model could be very diﬀerent from that obtained from the classical
DAD model. As shown in Figure 7 where R   2 and K   2, an optimal protection plan
from DAD-OTS model consists of line 10-12 and line 12-23, while an optimal protection plan
from DAD model consists of line 12-13 and line 20-23.
To have a complete benchmark, we present in Table 14 the total load shed of DAD
model under all R and K combinations, which are derived in [1]. Comparing it with Table
6, we can conﬁrm that load shed with transmission line switching is always less than those
without transmission line switching. More straightforward comparisons can be found in
Figure 8 and Figure 9, which present load shed (averaged over diﬀerent hardening budgets)
from DAD-OTS and DAD models under diﬀerent N -K contingencies and the relative load
shed reduction (in percentage) brought by transmission line switching.
As illustrated in Figures 8-9, transmission line switching has a very positive boosting
eﬀect on power grid hardening plans. In particular, for worst N -K contingencies withK   3,
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Figure 7: DAD-OTS and DAD solutions
more than 15% load shed reduction can be easily achieved, comparing to hardening plans
generated from DAD model. Nevertheless, such eﬀect reduces with respect to K. It can be
explained by the fact that, with K getting larger, there is less switching freedom left among
the survived transmission lines in the grid. Hence, the beneﬁt of transmission line switching
becomes smaller.
3.5.2 Cost-Eﬀectiveness Analysis
With our developed computing methods for DAD-TLS and DAD models, we can in-
vestigate the minimum hardening budget (i.e., the least number of transmission lines for
hardening) to achieve a desired level of load satisfaction under various N -K criteria, which
therefore provides a basic cost-eﬀectiveness analysis tool for hardening.
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Table 14: Load shed (MW) from DAD model
N-K R   0 R   1 R   2 R   3 R   4
N-0 143 143 143 143 143
N-1 230 206 204 204 202
N-2 397 327 311 291 291
N-3 484 447 398 359 350
N-4 570 536 446 437 425
N-5 706 596 529 502 480
N-6 795 667 606 569 547
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Next, we present a demonstration by considering the hardening budget under the
worst N -3 contingency. A general understanding as shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9 is that
with transmission switching, the load shed of a power grid considering N -3 contingency is
always less than that of a power grid without transmission switching under various hardening
budgets.
Figure 10 presents the numerical results between diﬀerent load satisfaction require-
ments and protection budgets in DAD-OTS and DAD models. It is straightforward to
realize that to have a higher proportion of load to be satisﬁed, we need larger protection
budgets. However, hardening plans derived from DAD-OTS and DAD demand for drastically
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diﬀerent economic investments. If we require that at least 85% total load must be met, 3
transmission lines should be hardened in the optimal DAD solution, while protecting 2 lines
is suﬃcient in the optimal DAD-OTS solution. Such diﬀerence becomes more noticeable
when the load satisfaction gets more stringent. For example, if at least 90% total load must
be met, at least 14 lines should be hardened in optimal DAD solution while only 5 lines
need to be protected in optimal DAD-OTS solution. Given the fact that practical transmis-
sion line hardening, e.g., placing lines underground, is very expensive, we can conclude that
by modeling and implementing transmission line switching as a post-contingency operation,
cost-eﬀective protection plans can be derived that signiﬁcantly outperform those obtained
without considering this switching operation.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies to incorporate transmission line switching operations into the
traditional defender-attacker-defender model. For this challenging tri-level DAD-TLS for-
mulation, we customize and implement nested column-and-constraint generation method to
derive optimal solutions. A set of numerical experiments is performed on the IEEE one-area
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RTS-96 system. Results verify the beneﬁts of incorporating transmission line switching as
a post-contingency operation into DAD model. In particular, it shows that resulting hard-
ening plans from DAD-TLS could be diﬀerent from those from DAD and they lead to very
cost-eﬀective hardening enhancement.
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CHAPTER 4: ROBUST OPTIMIZATION BASED RESILIENT
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK PLANNING AGAINST NATURAL
DISASTERS
4.1 Introduction
Resilience of power grids against natural disasters has been a fundamental issue for
the whole society. In recent years, hurricanes and extreme weather conditions have caused
enormous economic losses and even human casualties. Since the mission of power industry is
to keep the lights on, it is important to increase the resilience of existing power grids against
the uncertain natural disasters. According to the report [19] prepared by the President’s
Council of Economic Advisers and the U.S. Department of Energy, power outages that
occurred in the United States due to severe weather contributed to 58% of U.S. grid outages
and cost the economy an annual average of 18 to 33 billion dollars between 2003 and 2012.
Unfortunately, the impacts and ﬁnancial costs of natural disasters related to ﬂoods, drought,
and other weather events are expected to increase in signiﬁcance as what are historically
considered to be rare events are becoming more common and intense due to the climate
change [33]. It is also emphasized that continued investment in grid modernization and
resilience will mitigate these costs over time, saving the economy billions of dollars and
reducing the hardship experienced by millions of Americans [19]. However, hardening and
modernizing the whole grids is impossible due to its high cost. Hence, how to eﬀectively
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allocate budget limited resources to design a resilient power grid against natural disasters
remains a great challenge. Due to the complex nature of this problem, various optimization
models are proposed to facilitate the decision making process. These models range from
mixed-integer programs and quadratic programs to more sophisticated stochastic programs
and robust optimization to take account of the uncertainties involved.
4.1.1 Literature Review
As emphasized in [19], hardening is considered to be one of the most eﬀective ap-
proaches that can increase the resilience of a power grid through undergrounding power
lines, vegetation management, pole reinforcing, stockpiling power lines, etc. Previous re-
search on power grid hardening planning [1, 11, 12, 22, 34] focuses on the hardening of
transmission networks considering the uncertainty of terrorist attacks or natural disasters.
The uncertain terrorist attack or natural disaster models are often formulated as an N  K
worst-case network interdiction problem [10, 32]. However, the static budget uncertainty set
in this model ignores the spatial and temporal dynamics of the occurrence of a natural dis-
aster. The hardening planning problem on transmission systems is generally formulated as a
defender-attacker-defender sequential game model, which is equivalent to a two-stage robust
optimization problem. Heuristics and exact solutions are proposed to solve the complicated
tri-level program. In fact, the optimal solution of the model guarantees the eﬀectiveness of
hardening under the worst-case attack by alleviating system damage.
However, much less work has been done in recent years to support the hardening plan-
ning on distribution networks although storm-related outages often occur on distribution
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systems. In fact, about 90% of outages during the storm event occur on distribution systems
[19]. The models for hardening transmission networks are not directly applicable to hard-
ening distribution networks because distribution networks mostly possess a radial tree-like
network topology while transmission networks are more connected meshed networks. The
relatively simple linear program based DC power ﬂow models, which ignore reactive power
and voltage proﬁles, are widely used in transmission networks to approximate the power
ﬂow. However, distribution networks require the consideration of reactive power and voltage
proﬁles in the power ﬂow calculation as demonstrated in [35].
In [36], a two-stage stochastic mixed-integer program for designing a resilient distri-
bution network against natural disaster is presented, where damage scenarios from natural
disasters are modeled as a set of stochastic events. A multi-commodity network ﬂow model
is used to approximate the power ﬂow in the distribution network. The stochastic events
on a distribution network are predetermined with certain components at fault. A two-stage
robust optimization model for the distribution network reconﬁguration considering load un-
certainty is proposed in [37]. A mitigation method for electric distribution networks after
natural disasters by sectionalizing a distribution network into microgrids with distributed
generation (DG) units is presented in [38].
In the meantime, distributed generation resources impact critically the operations of a
distribution system. DG can improve power quality, enhance the reliability of supply, and
reduce system losses [39, 40]. The DG placement problem has therefore attracted the interest
of many research eﬀorts in the last two decades since it can provide the distribution system
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operators, regulators and policy makers useful input for the derivation of incentives and
regulatory measures. A common use of DG is serving as generation backup in case of main
supply interruption [39] or natural disasters [38]. In [41], a robust optimization based model
is proposed for placing DG units in microgrids with the consideration of load uncertainty
over the planning horizon. It is meaningful to plan the investment of DG units in view of
uncertain natural disasters since one of the main purposes of DG is to backup the system
during natural disasters.
4.1.2 Our Approach
This paper proposes a robust optimization based decision support tool for the planning
of a resilient distribution network. The optimal solution provides a network planning decision
that coordinates the hardening and DG resource placement and improves the resilience of
the distribution system against natural disasters.
The key contributions of the paper include are the following. First of all, we extend the
traditional attacker-defender game based N   K worst-case network interdiction model to
a more practical multi-stage network interdiction model with a multi-stage and multi-zone
based uncertainty set to capture the spatial and temporal dynamics of natural disasters such
as hurricanes. Secondly, a robust optimization based framework that considers uncertain
natural disaster occurrence is proposed to coordinate the planning of distribution systems
using hardening and DG resource placement. Thirdly, A computational algorithm is devel-
oped for solving the model. The empirical studies validate the eﬀectiveness of the proposed
model. Last but not least, results reveal the importance of DG, which transforms a distribu-
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tion network into several microgrids, in improving the distribution system’s resilience under
natural disasters.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the modeling
of network planning decisions, natural disaster modeling, power ﬂow model and two-stage
robust optimization formulation. Section 4.3 provides the column-and-constraint based de-
composition algorithm for the model. Section 4.4 presents the empirical results and discusses
the eﬀectiveness of the proposed model. Finally, a conclusion and discussion about future
research is given in Section 4.5.
4.2 Mathematical Formulation
In this section, we will present the planning decision set that coordinates hardening and
DG resource placement, the modeling of natural disaster occurrence, the power ﬂow model
for the distribution network and the two-stage robust optimization model for the overall
distribution network planning problem.
4.2.1 Network Planning Decisions
With a limited budget, a utility makes a plan to allocate budget limited resources
in order to enhance the resilience of a distribution system. In this paper, we consider
hardening power lines and DG resource placement. Other measures can be accommodated
by reformulating the planning decision set accordingly.
Hardening is a preventive measure that will increase the resilience of a power grid under
malicious terrorist attacks or natural disasters [19]. It is assumed that the hardened lines
will survive the disasters [1, 11, 12, 34, 42]. Here we use a cardinality budget set similar to
57
Table 15: Nomenclature used in Chapter 4
N set of indices of nodes
L set of indices of branches, i.e., power lines
T set of indices of time periods
n node index, n   N
i, j power line from node i to node j, directed, i, j   L
t time period index, t   T
Zt set of power lines aﬀected in Zone t
U natural disaster uncertainty set
Y network planning decision set
Fh,u feasible set of power ﬂow given h,u
H budget for hardening power lines
G budget for installing distributed generation units
Cd monetary planning budget
xij, rij reactance and resistance of power line i, j
Pnt, Qnt active and reactive power demand at node n in period t
Gpn capacity of distributed generation unit n
v, v lower and upper bounds on voltage levels
yij binary, 1 if line i, j is hardened, 0 otherwise
δn binary, 1 if a distributed generator is placed at node n, 0 otherwise
uij,t binary, 0 if power line i, j is damaged during a natural disaster in
period t, 1 otherwise
vnt voltage magnitude at node n in period t
gpnt active power generation of the distributed generation unit at node
n in period t
gqnt reactive power supply at node n in period t.
pij,t, qij,t active and reactive power ﬂow on power line i, j in period t
pldnt load shed at node n in period t
p,q,v vectors of active power variables pij,t, reactive power variables qij,t,
and voltage variables vnt
h concatenation of vector yij and vector δn, a network planning sce-
nario
u vector of uij,t, a natural disaster scenario
z vector of power ﬂow variables including active power ﬂow, reactive
power ﬂow, and voltage levels
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the budget sets used in hardening transmission networks [1, 11, 34, 42]. Additionally, DG
has been gaining interests as an eﬀective tool for reliability, losses and voltage improvements
[40], and also as a reliable energy source that can start almost instantaneously when a major
contingency occurs in a distribution system [43]. To study the eﬀectiveness of DG on system
resilience during natural disasters and analyze the optimal placement of DG resources, we
assume that there is a cardinality budget for the available DG units. Hence, a budget set
for the decision maker can be formulated as follows.
Y  
 


 i,jL
yij   H,

nN
δn   G


This decision set assumes that the decision maker has a budget to harden a maximum
of H power lines and to place a maximum of G DG units. As a matter of fact, we can
easily modify the decision set to accommodate more sophisticated decision scenarios, such
as considering the cost variations of DG units and hardening diﬀerent power lines. A simple
example similar to [12] is to consider the hardening cost to be proportional to the length of a
power line. Thus, we specify a hardening cost cl for each line and a cost cn for each DG unit.
Assuming that the total investment cannot exceed a monetary budget Cd, an alternative
network planning decision set can be formulated as Y
 
.
Y
 

 


 i,jL
cijyij 

nN
cnδn   Cd


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4.2.2 Natural Disaster Occurrence Model
Natural disasters are generally highly uncertain events that are diﬃcult to predict,
estimate and model. A lot of eﬀorts are made to increase our awareness of natural disasters
based on historical data and the lessons we learned. The forecasting of a natural disaster is
often based on statistical models or simulation models as reviewed in [44]. Predeﬁned natural
disaster scenarios are assumed in [36] with uniform probability. In this paper, we develop
a multi-stage natural disaster occurrence model based on the traditional N   K network
interdiction model to capture the spatial and temporal dynamics of a natural disaster. To
be speciﬁc, we consider the case of hurricanes.
4.2.2.1 Spatial and Temporal Dynamics of Hurricanes
As revealed by the Hurricane Forecast Improvement Program [45], a hurricane often
follows a path that consists of multiple periods and several associated geographic zones (see
Fig. 11). Also, the wind speed of a hurricane, which is one of the most destructive forces
of a hurricane, decreases once the storm lands and drifts away from the sustaining heat and
moisture provided by ocean or gulf waters. This can be seen from Fig. 12 that wind speed
quickly decays over time after landfall. Geographically, the wind speed decays along its path
as shown in Fig. 13 based on the inland wind model [46].
4.2.2.2 Modeling Natural Disasters on Power Grids
Terrorist attacks or natural disaster occurrences on a power system are often modeled
as an attacker-defender game, i.e., the bi-level worst-case network interdiction model as used
in [1, 8, 10–12, 32, 34, 42], where the outer level represents the attacker’s decision with limited
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Figure 11: A typical evolution of hurricane
attack resources and the lower level is a defenders recourse decision with a re-dispatch of
power ﬂow based on the damage caused by the attacker. The attacker’s decision set is deﬁned
by an uncertainty set with a limited budget of attack resources. This budget reﬂects the
system operator’s estimation of the damage level caused by possible attacks. As a matter of
fact, uncertainty sets have been widely used in power systems to capture various uncertain
factors, such as uncertain demand [47–50], renewable generation [51], system contingency
[26, 52], terrorists attacks. and natural disasters [1, 8, 11], etc. In this study, we also use the
attacker-defender game based network interdiction model to model the impacts of natural
disasters since this approach gives the worst-case scenario of all feasible natural disaster
scenarios in the feasible set of attacker. However, diﬀerent from the traditional attacker-
defender models [11, 14, 31, 32], where a simple cardinality budget constraint on the whole
system damage is assumed, the uncertainty set in this paper takes account of the spatial
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Figure 12: Decay of hurricane attack
and temporal dynamics of a natural disaster by constructing a more realistic uncertainty
set as an extension to the traditional N  K worst-case contingency based natural disaster
model. Based on the spatial and temporal dynamics of a hurricane, we assume that when
a hurricane moves into an area, it will land on the zone that is close to the coastline and
the ﬂood and strong rotating wind will impact the power lines within the zone whereas
the far-away power lines will stay intact. Within the aﬀected zone, an N  K contingency
network interdiction model is used to estimate impacts of the hurricane. As the hurricane
pushes towards the inland area, it will aﬀect the regions from one zone to another based on
the geographic locations.
An illustrative case based on the IEEE 33-node distribution system is provided in Fig.
14. First of all, the distribution system is divided into several zones based on the path of
the hurricane movement and the geographic locations of the power lines. Zone 1 is close
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Figure 13: Extent of inland winds from category 3 hurricanes
to the coastline, which will suﬀer from the hurricane impact ﬁrst. In the second period,
the hurricane will move to the inland area and cause damage to the power lines in Zone 2.
Finally, the hurricane will reach Zone 3. Hence, we can divide the hurricane occurrence into
multiple periods and zones based on the path of the hurricane. This type of natural disaster
event can be described using the ﬂowing uncertainty set U.
U  
 


 i,jZ1
 1 uij,1  B1,
uij,1  1,  i, j  LZ1,

 i,jZ2
 1 uij,2  B2,
uij,2  uij,t1,  i, j  LZ2,
......

 i,jZT
 1 uij,T   BT ,
uij,t  uij,t1,  i, j  LZt, t  T,

	
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Figure 14: A hurricane occurrence model
where Bt is the cardinality budget for the number of damaged lines in the aﬀected zone Zt
for period t. Constraints uij,t uij,t 1, i, j L Zt mean that the power lines not in the
aﬀected zone of period t will remain the same as their previous status. In this method, the
hurricane impact within each zone is formulated as an N K worst-case network interdiction
problem. The uncertainty set becomes the traditional N K worst-case contingency analysis
if the whole distribution system is considered as one zone that is aﬀected at the same time.
The above uncertainty set describes the feasible set of the attacker in the attack-defender
model. The operational power ﬂow model for the defender is presented in the following
distribution network power ﬂow model.
4.2.3 Distribution Network Power Flow
4.2.3.1 DG Operations
When a natural disaster occurs to a distribution system, backup or standby DG units
such as fossil fueled combustion generators will pick up certain lost load. A previous paper
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[41] on DG placement assumes that if a DG unit is placed at node n, this DG unit can
supply power to node n and the child branches of node n in the radial tree network, where
the substation is regarded as the root node of the tree. No power ﬂow is allowed form node
n to its parent node. Even though system reconﬁguration, through which a power system
still maintains a radial topology [35] or forms islanded microgrids [38], allows a DG to even
serve its parent nodes in the original tree network, these techniques are not considered in
this research. In fact, during or after a natural disaster occurrence, it is diﬃcult for the dis-
tribution system operator to obtain the global information of the switch devices and other
system status information through either the communication system or dispatched main-
tenance personnel, not to mention deploying a reconﬁguration plan or remotely controlling
switch devices with massive damage in the system. Hence, similar to [41], this paper assumes
that a DG can supply power to the node it is placed and its child branches that are not
damaged by the disaster attack.
4.2.3.2 Distribution Network Power Flow Model
The power ﬂow model used in hardening transmission networks is often linear DC
optimal power ﬂow model [1, 8, 11] which considers active power and phase angles but
ignores reactive power and voltage levels. Unlike the transmission systems, which are often
meshed networks, the distribution networks mostly possess and maintain a tree-like radial
topology. DistFlow [35] equations are often used to calculate the complex power ﬂow and
voltage proﬁle in a distribution system [35, 38, 41, 53].
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Figure 15: A typical radial distribution network
Based on [35], the DistFlow equations are deﬁned as in equations (4.1) to (4.3). For
simplicity, time index t is dropped in equations (4.1) to (4.6). For any node n, its parent
node i, i.e.,  i, n  L, and its child nodes j, i.e.,  n, j  L.
 
j n,jL
pnj  pin  rin
p2in  q
2
in
v2n
 Pn, (4.1)
 
j n,jL
qnj  qin  xin
p2in  q
2
in
v2n
Qn, (4.2)
v2j  v
2
i  2 rijpij  xijqij   r
2
ij  x
2
ij 
p2i  q
2
i
v2i
,  i, j  L. (4.3)
The linearized version of the power ﬂow equations has been extensively justiﬁed and
used in distribution systems [35, 38, 41, 53]. Considering the whole radial network, DG and
load shed, equations (4.1) to (4.3) can be simpliﬁed as follows.
 
j n,jL
pnj  pin  Pn  g
p
n  p
ld
n , (4.4)
 
j n,jL
qnj  qin Qn  g
q
n, (4.5)
vj  vi 
rijpij  xijqij
V0
,  i, j  L. (4.6)
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To be speciﬁc, (4.4) and (4.5) represent that the active and reactive power ﬂow are
balanced at each node. (4.6) respects the voltage level at each node. In our model, the
distribution network topology depends on network planning decisions and the uncertainty
set of the natural disaster. This relationship can be described as follows.
0   pij,t  M
1
t yij  uij,t, t  T, i, j  L (4.7)
0   qij,t  M
2
t yij  uij,t, t  T, i, j  L (4.8)
0   gpnt   δnG
p
n, t  T, n  N (4.9)
(4.7) and (4.8) force the active and reactive power ﬂow of a branch to be zero if the
branch fails in the disaster (uij  0) yet not hardened (yij  0). However, if the branch
is either hardened (yij  1) or not damaged during attack (uij  1), i.e., uij  yij  1,
the zero upper bound on pij and qij is removed. M
1
t and M
2
t are big M values. The easy
values for M1t and M
2
t are the total active power demand and reactive power consumption
in the distribution system respectively. Based on the above, the optimal power ﬂow for
distribution network after hardening and DG placement planning (h) and disaster impact
(u) can be formulated as:
z  p,q,v  Fh,u 
	
 
j n,jL
pnj,t  pin,t 
 Pnt  g
p
nt  p
ld
nt, t  T, n  N, i, n  L (4.10)
 
j n,jL
qnj,t  qin,t 
Qnt  g
q
nt, t  T, n  N, i, n  L (4.11)
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0   gpnt   δnG
p
n, t  T, n  N (4.12)
0   gqnt   Qnt, t  T, n  N (4.13)
0   pldnt   Pnt, t  T, n  N (4.14)
v   vn,t   v, t  T, n  N (4.15)
0   pij,t   M
1
t yij  uij,t, t  T, i, j  L (4.16)
0   qij,t   M
2
t yij  uij,t, t  T, i, j  L (4.17)
vjt  vit 
rijpij,t  xijqij,t
V0
, t  T, i, j  L	 (4.18)
(4.12)-(4.13) restrain the active and reactive power generation at node n. (4.14) forces
the upper bound of the unsatisﬁed real demand within its real demand. (4.15) ensures the
voltage levels are within a predeﬁned secure range. To simplify the notation, an abstract
form of the above feasible set is given as:
Fh,u  
z : Ah Bu Cz  e	.
4.2.4 Robust Optimization Model
The overall resilient distribution network planning problem is formulated as a two-stage
robust optimization problem [47, 50], which is also called a defender-attacker-defender game
model [1, 11, 12, 22]. Even though the two-stage robust optimization and the defender-
attacker-defender model may have diﬀerent origins, they share an identical tri-level mathe-
matical programming structure. The objective of the model is to minimize the unsatisﬁed
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demand, i.e., load shed, in the distribution system over T periods under the worst-case
natural disaster’s attack. Feasible sets of Y, U, and F h,u are deﬁned as above.
min
h Y
max
u U
min
z F h,u
 
n,t
pldnt (4.19)
4.3 Solution Methodology
In this section, we describe how to decompose the original model based on the column-
and-constraint algorithm and formulate the corresponding master problem and subproblem
for the proposed model (4.19).
4.3.1 CCG Master Problem
The CCG master problem contains a set of worst-case disaster scenarios Uˆ  uˆs, s 
1, 2, ..., k. The worst-case disaster scenarios are obtained from the CCG subproblem over
the iterations. Note that solving the CCG master problem yields a network planning decision
hˆ and a lower bound of the original model since the CCG master problem is a relaxation of
the original model. Indeed, if Uˆ contains all possible disaster scenarios, the master problem
is equivalent to the original model.
minα (4.20)
st. h  Y (4.21)
α 
 
n,t
pld,snt , s  1, 2, ..., k (4.22)
zs  F h, uˆs, s  1, 2, ..., k. (4.23)
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4.3.2 CCG Subproblem
The CCG subproblem seeks the worst-case natural disaster scenario with a given net-
work planning decision hˆ from the CCG master problem. Let π be the vector of the dual
variables for constraints (4.10)-(4.18) and Ω hˆ,u  denotes the feasible set of the dual inner
linear program,
Ω hˆ,u   π : C
Tπ  I,
with a given hardening plan hˆ. Then the bi-level subproblem can be transformed to a bilinear
program as follows.
max
uU
min
zF hˆ,u
 
n,t
pldnt  max
uU
max
πΩ hˆ,u
e Ahˆ Bu π
 max
uU,πΩ hˆ,u
e Ahˆ Bu π (4.24)
The above bilinear program can be linearized using the big-M method and then solved
by an MIP solver. The solution from CCG subproblem together with the corresponding
network planning solution (hˆ, uˆ, zˆ) form a feasible solution for the original tri-level program
and thus provide an upper bound for the original model.
4.3.3 Algorithm Implementation
The detailed algorithm implementation procedure is described in Algorithm 3. The
tolerance gap of optimality for the algorithm is .
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Algorithm 3 : CCG decomposition algorithm for RDNP
Initialization: set LB   , UB   , Uˆ  ∅, iteration index k   0, gap   , hˆ  0
while gap   do
solve CCG subproblem with given plan hˆ, obtain objective value objSP and disaster
scenario u , UB   minUB, objSP , update gap and k   k  1;
add u  to Uˆ, create dispatch variables zk	, and add these variables (i.e., columns)
with corresponding constraints zk 
 Fh,uk	 to CCG master problem;
solve CCG master problem, update LB with optimal value objMP , update network
planning plan hˆ and gap;
end while
return h    hˆ. 
4.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we perform computational experiments to test the proposed model and
algorithm. The IEEE 33-node distribution network is used in this study. The parameters of
the system are adopted from [35] with distributed generators initially located at nodes 7, 12,
and 27, each with a capacity of 10 MW. The natural disaster occurrence model used is based
on the uncertainty set U deﬁned for hurricane attacks on the IEEE 33-node distribution
system in Section II. The solution algorithm is implemented in C++ with CPLEX 12.6 on
a dual-core PC with 6GB RAM.
4.4.1 Hurricane Occurrence
The optimal solution of the worst-case hurricane occurrence model is obtained by solv-
ing the bi-level attacker-defender model, i.e., CCG subproblem. As shown in Fig. 14, the
whole dynamic evolution process of the hurricane is divided into three stages. During each
period, the hurricane attack will cause power line failures with a cardinality budget. The
power lines that failed in the previous time period will remain at fault in the next stage.
Fig. 16 gives a worst case hurricane attack plan with the natural disaster uncertainty set
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B1 2, B2 2, B3 1 , which means there are at most two power lines out for Zone 1 and
Zone 2, and one power line out for Zone 3. The optimal solution of the hurricane occurrence
model gives a worst-case hurricane scenario within a given uncertainty set. To be speciﬁc,
in the ﬁrst time period, lines 12-13 and 32-33 will be damaged as the hurricane lands in
Zone 1. In the second period, the hurricane moves along its path and damages lines 7-8 and
27-28 in Zone 2. Finally, when the hurricane arrives in Zone 3, it cuts oﬀ line 1-2. This
attack will cause a power outage of 5520 KW out of the total demand of 11435 KW. Note
that this hurricane scenario dominates any other possible hurricane scenarios in the deﬁned
uncertainty set since it is the optimal solution of the attacker-defender model.
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Figure 16: The worst-case hurricane scenario
4.4.2 Eﬀectiveness of Hardening
To validate the eﬀectiveness of hardening on distribution networks, we study the load
shed in the distribution system under a hurricane scenario for various hardening budgets.
The hurricane scenarios considered is B1 B2 B3 1 , which means that there will
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be one uncertain power line damaged in the aﬀected zone during each period. The optimal
hardening plans, corresponding worst-case hurricane scenarios and load shed are given in
Table 16 for hardening budget from H   0 to H   6. The power lines damaged under
the worst-case hurricane scenarios are listed in the order of occurrence. Without hardening
the system, this worst-case hurricane scenario will cause 4730 KW load shed in the grid.
However, if we can harden one line (1-2), the load shed will be reduced to 4270 KW. Each
time we add one more line to the hardening budget, the load shed for the uncertain natural
disaster decreases. By hardening six power lines in the IEEE 33-node system, the load shed
will be reduced from 4730 KW to 2830 KW, which is a reduction of more than 40%.
Table 16: Hardening plans
H hardened lines load shed (KW) worst-case attack
0 None 4730 (12-13;27-28;1-2)
1 1-2 4270 (12-13;27-28;2-3)
2 1-2,2-3 3880 (12-13;27-28;3-23)
3 1-2,2-3,12-13 3700 (13-14;27-28;3-23)
4 1-2,2-3,12-13,13-14 3340 (12-13;6-26;3-23)
5 1-2,2-3,27-28,28-29,29-30 3120 (12-13;30-31;3-23)
6 1-2,2-3,12-13,13-14,3-23,23-24 2830 (14-15;27-28;24-25)
A more comprehensive study of the system load shed with diﬀerent hardening budgets,
H    0, 1, ..., 33 and diﬀerent hurricane uncertainty sets, B1  B2  B3  1, B1  B2 
B3  2, and B1  B2  B3  3, is given in Fig. 17. As shown in Fig. 17, for all natural
disaster occurrence scenarios, the load shed in the distribution system is monotonically
decreasing with respect to the increase of the hardening budget. This proves the eﬀectiveness
of hardening. Moreover, for the same hardening budget, a stronger hurricane, i.e., a hurricane
with larger B1, B2, and B3, will cause more load shed in the system. In fact, this plot can
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Figure 17: Load shed of distribution system
serve as a decision support tool to determine the hardening budget needed with respect to
the estimated natural disaster category and the desired distribution system resilience level.
4.4.3 Inﬂuence of Distributed Generation
The DG units can continue supplying power to connected loads in the form of micro-
grids when the distribution system is at fault [38, 43]. To investigate the importance of DG
in the distribution system during natural disasters, a comparison among network planning
without DG, with predeﬁned DG and with optimal DG placement is studied. As can be seen
from Fig. 18, the eﬀectiveness of hardening in terms of reduced load shed in a hurricane is
improved by DG as the load shed with DG is generally less than the case without DG, except
for the case where every power line is hardened. Moreover, with a coordinated network plan-
ning solution of hardening and DG placement,i.e., the solution with optimal DG placement,
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Figure 18: Impacts of DG on distribution system resilience
the distribution network is the most resilient among the three solutions as it results in the
least load shed. In fact, when a distribution network is damaged by a natural disaster, the
loads in branches that are disconnected from the main grid will be picked up by a DG unit
if available. The DG units with connected branches will form microgrids where the power
can be supplied by the DG within the microgrid. This interesting observation points to the
importance of placing DG units and forming microgrids to increase the distribution network
resilience under natural disasters as elaborated in [36, 38] and the necessity to coordinate the
placement of DG resource placement with hardening in the distribution network planning
process.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter proposes a novel model for the planning of a resilient distribution system
with hardening and distributed generation using two-stage robust optimization to minimize
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the total load shed under natural disasters. The proposed model coordinates the optimal
planning of hardening and DG resource placement. A multi-stage and multi-zone based
uncertainty set is used to capture the uncertainty of natural disaster as an extension of
the traditional N  K interdiction model. A decomposition algorithm is designed and im-
plemented to solve the tri-level program. Numerical results validate the eﬀectiveness of
model. Studies also point to the importance of placing distributed generation to increase
the resilience of a distribution system against natural disasters.
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CHAPTER 5: FAST DECOMPOSITION ALGORITHM FOR ROBUST
UNIT COMMITMENT PROBLEM
5.1 Introduction
As one of the essential operation problems in power systems, unit commitment (UC)
is an optimization problem that minimizes the system commitment cost and dispatch cost.
Typically, such problem can be formulated as a mixed-integer program (MIP) model, includ-
ing binary decisions on generators on/oﬀ status and continuous decisions on their generation
levels and dispatch, subject to many physical restrictions and economic requirements, such
as load balance constraints, transmission network constraints, generators’ ramping up/down,
min up/down time constraints, etc. Such MIP model is computationally sophisticated, not-
ing that UC is an NP-hard problem [54] in nature.
Currently, the operations of large-scale power systems are facing increasing challenges
from the penetration of renewable energy generation from the wind and solar, demand side
management, smart grids, etc. These new technologies bring many nontrivial uncertainties
and randomness into the operations of power grids and put the reliability of power system at
risk. To handle those ubiquitous uncertainties in the system, various stochastic and robust
UC models are developed and investigated. In particular, the robust UC has drawn inten-
sive attentions from both academia and industry. One critical advantage it carries is that,
instead of assuming alluring probability distribution for uncertain parameters in stochastic
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Table 17: Nomenclature used in Chapter 5
j generator index
l transmission line index
n bus index
t time (hour) index
N set of indices of buses
T set of schedule horizon
J set of indices of generators
Jn set of indices of generators connected to bus n
L set of indices of transmission lines
o l origin bus of transmission asset l
d l destination bus of transmission asset l
ai start up cost of unit i
ci fuel cost of unit i
cls load shed penalty
cSUjm start up cost of generator j for start up type m
qnt lower bound of demand at bus n in time t
 qnt uncertain part of demand at bus n in time t
Pl power ﬂow capacity of transmission line l
Sj start-up segments of generator j
δ¯ phase angle capacity of connecting bus
DTj minimum down time of unit j
UTj minimum up time of unit j
Gj maximum output level of unit j
Gj minimum output level of unit j
RDj maximum ramp-down rate of unit j
RUj maximum ramp-up rate of unit j
SDj maximum shutdown rate of unit j
SUj maximum startup rate of unit j
T SUjm oﬄine hours of unit j
ujt binary, 1 if unit j is on in t, 0 otherwise
vjt binary, 1 if unit j is turned on at the start of t
wjt binary, 1 if unit j is turned oﬀ at the start of t
znt binary, 1 if demand reaches upper bound in t, 0 otherwise
hjmt binary, startup-type m of unit j, which takes the value of 1 in the
hour where units starts up and has been previously oﬀ-line within
T SUg,m, T
SU
g,m 1 hours
qnt power demand at bus n in time t
gjt power generation level of unit j in time t
dnt load shed at bus n in time t
δnt phase angle at bus n in time t
plt power ﬂow on transmission line l in time t.
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UC models, robust UC adopts a convenient uncertainty set to capture randomness and it
guarantees that its solution, if derived, is feasible to any realization within the uncertainty
set [50, 55, 56].
Though robust UC takes care of the uncertainties in determining UC decisions, the
complexity of solving robust UC actually increases drastically, comparing with the basic
UC model. Due to its complicated tri-level structure, directly computing robust UC using
existing professional packages is not feasible. Instead, researchers and practitioners develop
and implement two types of decomposition algorithms to solve it. One is based on classical
Benders decomposition method [55–57]. The other one is a recent column-and-constraint
generation [17] (CCG) method, which also employs a master-subproblem framework to ex-
actly compute robust UC [50]. Comparing these two types of algorithms on both small-scale
instances and large-scale ISO level power grids, it is observed that the CCG based solu-
tion procedure drastically outperforms the other one. We note that CCG method makes it
possible to compute the day-ahead robust UC model on practical grids without considering
transmission network constraints.
Nevertheless, in large grids, such as multi-state power grids that are managed by ISOs,
we observe that the basic implementation of CCG method might not provide satisfactory
computational performance. In particular, considering full network structures and their as-
sociated restrictions leads to heavy computational burdens on both the master and subprob-
lems. To support real operations and practices in large grids, in this chapter, we study new
computational improvement strategies for robust UC problem with the consideration of the
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demand uncertainty. As a matter of fact, other types of uncertainties can be accommodated
accordingly.
5.2 Problem Formulation
In this chapter, we consider the day-ahead unit commitment problem with J thermal
units for T time periods for a power system with N buses and L transmission lines. In the
remainder of this chapter, we follow the convention that one period stands for 60 minutes
and thus T equals to 24 hours. Note that our model and solution method are applicable
to any time scale. To minimize the operating cost and to meet physical requirements,
generators’ on/oﬀ status as well as start up operations need to be determined day-ahead
while the actual generation outputs and market sell/buy decisions will be made in a real-
time fashion. Hence, using the two-stage robust optimization modeling scheme, the robust
unit commitment (RUC) problem is formulated as the following.
min
T 
t 1
 
jJ
 ajujt 
 
mSj
cSUjmhjmt max
qQ
min 
T 
t 1
 
jJ
cjgjt 
T 
t 1
 
nN
clsdnt (5.1)
s.t. hjmt 
TSUj,m 11 
i TSUjm
wj,ti, j, t  T
SU
j,m1, T  (5.2)
 
mSj
hjmt 	 vjt, j, t  1, T  (5.3)
t 
i tUTj1
vji  ujt, j, t  UTj  1, T  (5.4)
t 
i tDTj1
wji  1
 ujt, j, t  DTj  1, T  (5.5)
ujt 
 uj,t1 	 vjt 
 wjt, j, t  1, T  (5.6)
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gjt   gj,t 1   RUjuj,t 1  SUjvjt, j, t  1, T  (5.7)
gj,t 1  gj,t   RDjujt  SDjwjt, j, t  1, T  (5.8)
Guj,t   gjt   Gjuj,t, j, t  1, T  (5.9)
pltxl  δol,t  δdl,t, l  L, t  1, T  (5.10)
 
jJn
gjt 
 
loln
plt 
 
ldln
plt  dnt  qnt, n  N, t  1, T  (5.11)
Pl   plt   Pl, l  L, t  1, T  (5.12)
δ   δnt   δ, n  N, t  1, T  (5.13)
0   dnt   qnt, n  N, t  1, T  (5.14)
where, q  Q is the uncertainty set deﬁned in (5.15), which is similar to [55], to capture the
uncertainty of demand.
Q	q, z,k
 
 
qnt  q
nt, qnt  znt   q
nt,

n
znt   kt, znt  0, 1

. (5.15)
To be speciﬁc, constraints (5.2) and (5.3) are introduced to consider the startup costs
as a monotone increasing step function of the unit’s previous oﬄine time (details can be
found in [58]). Constraints (5.4) and (5.5) are the minimum up/down time constraints.
(5.6) reﬂect the logic relationships between generator on-oﬀ status, turn-on and turn-oﬀ
variables. Constraints (5.7) and (5.8) are ramping up/down constraints. Constraints(5.9)
specify generator’s active power level. Constraints(5.10) represent the Kirchhoﬀ’s law. Con-
straints (5.11) make sure the load is balanced at each bus. Constraints (5.12) specify the
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active power ﬂow limits on transmission lines. Constraints (5.13) are the phase angle limit.
Constraints (5.14) guarantee the load shed on buses does not exceed their demand.
To simplify the notations in this chapter, we use the abstract form of the above formu-
lation. Let x be the vector of all binary commitment variables and U    x : Fx  f
denote the associated feasible set deﬁned by constraints in (5.2) - (5.6). Similarly, let
y,p be the vector of continuous variables where y represents all generation level vari-
ables gjt and p denote the rest of economic dispatch and market decision variables. Let
Ωx,q   y,p : AxBy  g,Cy Dp Eq  h,Gp  r be the associated feasible
set deﬁned by constraints in (5.7) - (5.14) for given x,q. As a result, our RUC problem
can be compactly represented as the following.
min
x U
axmax
q Q
min
 y,pΩ x,q
by  cp (5.16)
5.3 Basic CCG Implementation for RUC
For the presented tri-level RUC problem, we use CCGmethod that iteratively computes
RUC master problem and RUC subproblem. Note that RUC master problem is formulated
with a subset of the worst-case demand scenarios, while RUC subproblem is a bi-level pro-
gram which seeks for the worst-case scenario for a given commitment plan xˆ.
5.3.1 RUC Master Problem
It is a relaxation of the original tri-level program with a subset of worst-case demand
scenarios  qˆs, s  1, 2, ..., S generated by the RUC subproblem (	ˆ denotes a ﬁxed deci-
sion variable or vector of 	). The dispatch variables and constraints associated with each
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scenario are included in the formulation. The solution of RUC master problem gives a
commitment plan that is feasible with respect to the already included worst-case demand
scenarios. Meanwhile, its optimal value gives a lower bound for the original RUC.
min β   ax (5.17)
s.t. x  U (5.18)
β  bys   cps, s  1, 2, ..., S (5.19)
ys,ps  Ωx, qˆs, s  1, 2, ..., S (5.20)
where ys,ps are the generation and dispatch decision variables for scenario s. Since RUC
master problem is a single level MIP, it can be readily solved by most MIP solvers.
5.3.2 RUC Subproblem
For a given commitment plan xˆ  uˆjt, vˆjt, wˆjt for the next T periods, we compute the
following RUC subproblem to derive its optimal solution qˆs, yˆs, pˆs. Note that (1). qˆs is a
worst-case demand scenario with respect to xˆ, which will be used to augment RUC master
problem. (2). xˆ, yˆs, pˆs is a feasible solution to the overall RUC problem, which provides
an upper bound.
max
q Q
minby   cp (5.21)
s.t. y,p  Ωxˆ,q. (5.22)
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To solve such bi-level problem, strong duality or Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condi-
tions [17] can be employed to convert it into a single level nonlinear problem, which can then
be linearized as an MIP and computed by solvers. Hence, the whole CCG procedure can
simply be implemented with the help of an MIP solver.
5.3.3 Basic CCG Decomposition Framework
A basic implementation of the decomposition algorithm framework based on the column-
and-constraint generation is described in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 : Basic CCG algorithm for RUC
1: initialization:ub  , lb  , gap  1, s  0
2: while gap   do   is the predeﬁned tolerable gap
3: solve RUC master problem, update lb, xˆ, gap
4: solve RUC subproblem, update ub, qˆs, gap
5: add Ωx, qˆs to RUC master problem
6: s  s	 1
7: end while
8: return xˆ 
5.4 RUC Master Problem Improvements
As mentioned in Section I, the computational performance of the basic CCG method
might not be satisfactory to support real operations in large grids. In particular, we ﬁrst
note that more and more variables and constraints are created and included in RUC master
problem over iterations, which lead to large-scale MIPs. We also observed that computing
RUC subproblem is extremely time-consuming for large grids with full transmission net-
work constraints. So, we study new computational methods and strategies to address such
computational challenge, including incorporating strong formulations for basic UC model,
deriving new valid inequalities considering network constraints for each worst-case scenario,
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and designing and implementing a new decomposition procedure for computing robust unit
commitment subproblem.
5.4.1 Strong Formulation for RUC Master Problem
The strong formulation is implemented as a technique to speed up the solution of
deterministic UC [58, 59]. In [59], a set of tight constraints for the minimum up/down, and
ramping up/down constraints is introduced, which has a clear positive impact on reducing
computation time. So, we adopt those constraints in order to strengthen our RUC master
problem since minimum up/down, and ramping up/down constraints are considered in the
RUC master problem. Note that the strong formulation is used for each set of dispatch
variables and constraints  ys,ps  Ωx, qˆs. For simplicity, we omit the demand scenario
index s and generator index j in the following constraints.
For generation upper bound, constraints (5.23) serve to make the upper bound on
power output a function of ut, vt and wt.
gt  Gu tKt 
Kt 
i1
 SD  i 1RDwti Gvti, 	t  
1, T  (5.23)
where Kt  max k   1, ...UT SD  k  1RD  G, k  t  T . This mean that if the
generator is turned oﬀ at time t  1, then it cannot produce more than SDj in t. If it is
turned oﬀ in t2, then it cannot produce more than SDj RDj. Detailed explanations can
be found in [59]. In our study, (5.23) are used instead of traditional generator upper bound
constraints to provide a tighter linear program approximation to the original mixed-integer
program based master problem.
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Similarly, ramping down constraints (5.8) can be strengthened as (5.24), (5.25), and
(5.26). If RD   SU G and UT  2,
gt 1  gt  RDut  SDwt  RD  SU Gvt 1  RD Gvt, t 	 
1, T 
else, gt 1  gjt  RDut  SDwt, t 	 
1, T . (5.24)
If RD   SU G, UT  3, and DT  2,
gt 1  gt  RDut1  SDwt  RDwt1  RD Gvt
RD  SU Gvt 1  RDvt1, t 	 
1, T  1. (5.25)
(5.24) are valid inequalities and dominate (5.8). Constraints (5.25) take into account infor-
mation from time t 1 and constraints (5.26) consider ramping over two time periods.
gt 2  gt  2RDut  SDwt 1  SD  RDjwt  2RDvt 2  2RD Gvt 1
2RD Gvt, t 	 
2, T  2. (5.26)
Ramping up constraints (5.27) and (5.28) are formulated to replace constraints (5.7)
for each scenario in RUC master problem. If RU   SD G and UT  2,
gt  gt 1  RUut Gwt  RD  SU Gwt1  SU  RUvt, t 	 
1, T  1
else, gt  gt 1  RUut 1  SUvt, t 	 
1, T . (5.27)
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If RU   SD G, UT  2, and DT  2,
gt  gt 2  2RUut Gwt 1  wt  SU  RUvt 1  SU  2RUvt, t 	 
2, T . (5.28)
The above tight constraints are used in the RUC master formulation to replace the
classical minimum up/down and ramping up/down constraints.
5.5 Reformulation and Decomposition Algorithm for RUC Subproblem
As previously mentioned, for bi-level RUC subproblem, a traditional way is to convert
it into a single level program by strong duality or KKT conditions. However, this process
yields a huge MIP, which actually has a very weak linear program relaxation that is very
diﬃcult to compute for larger networks. To address such challenge, we novelly reformulate
that bi-level program into a tri-level program by separating y and p variables. Speciﬁcally,
we equivalently reformulate (5.21)-(5.22) as
max
qQ
minby min cp (5.29)
s.t. y,p 	 Ωxˆ,q. (5.30)
Physically, such disconnection separates the generation level (deﬁned by ramping con-
straints) decisions and dispatch decisions. Moreover, by dualizing the inner-most minimiza-
tion problem, which computes the dispatching decisions for each individual hour, we have,
max
qQ
min
 
by maxyTCTqTET  hT  rT π

(5.31)
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st. Axˆ By  g, (5.32)
GT DT π  cT . (5.33)
Note, T is the transpose of  and π is the vector of dual variables. Again, we employ
CCG method to decompose this tri-level formulation. To simplify our exposition, we call
the master problem of this CCG implementation as “scenario master” and the subproblem
as “scenario subproblem”, which indicate that they are designed to solve RUC subproblem
to derive the worst-case scenario.
5.5.1 Scenario Master Problem
The scenario master problem computes the worst-case demand scenario, for a set of
feasible generation decisions yˆk, k  1, ..., K	 (solutions from scenario subproblem).
max η (5.34)
s.t. η  byˆk   yˆkTCT  hT   rT πk (5.35)
q 
 Q, (5.36)
Axˆ Byˆk  g, (5.37)
GT DT πk  cT , k  1, ..., K. (5.38)
Nonlinear constraints can be linearized and the whole formulation can be converted
into an MIP.
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5.5.2 Scenario Subproblem
The scenario subproblem is a DC economic dispatch problem with commitment plan xˆ
given from the NCCG master problem and load scenario qˆ derived from the scenario master
problem. The variables left in the scenario subproblem is the generating levels of generators,
phase angles of buses, branch power ﬂow, and the load shed. As a matter of fact, this
subproblem is a linear program and only continuous variables are involved.
min by  cp (5.39)
s.t.  y,p  Ω xˆ, qˆ. (5.40)
5.6 Improved Algorithm Framework
Combining the above improvements, the new algorithm can be stated as in Algorithm
5 where the subroutine matches the reformulation and decomposition algorithm for bi-level
RUC subproblem.
5.7 Computational Results
The computational study is conducted on a dual-core PC with 4GB RAM. The CPLEX
12.6 is used to solve the MIP or linear program. The program is implemented with C++
and Visual Studio. The IEEE 118-bus system with 54 generators and 186 transmission lines
is used as a test system.
First of all, we compare the eﬀectiveness of the reformulation and decomposition for
RUC subproblem with traditional strong duality based approach (used in [50, 57]) in Table
18. Four random instances are tested. The exit condition is either optimal (denoted by O)
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Algorithm 5 : Improved CCG algorithm for RUC
1: procedure (CCG)
2: initialization:ub  , lb  , gap  1, s  0
3: while gap   do
4: solve RUC master problem with strong formulation and constraints (??), update
lb, xˆ, gap
5: solve RUC bi-level subproblem through Subroutine, update ub, qˆs, gap
6: add Ωx, qˆs to RUC master problem
7: s  s 1
8: end while
9: return xˆ 
10: end procedure
Subroutine: Solving RUC subproblem
11: procedure (RUC subproblem)
12: initialization:ub
 
  , lb
 
  , gap
 
  1, k   0
13: while gap
 
 
 
do
14: solve scenario master problem, update ub
 
, gap
 
15: solve scenario subproblem, update lb
 
, yˆk, gap
 
16: add {πk, yˆk,(5.37-5.38)} to scenario master problem
17: k  k  1
18: end while
19: return qˆ
20: end procedure
where the gap is within 0.1% or computational time reaches 10 minutes time limit (denoted
by T). Using the traditional strong duality-based single level reformulation approach, all
instances stopped after reaching the time limit. By using the CCG reformulation, all in-
stances reached optimal solutions within the time limit. It clearly shows that the improved
decomposition algorithm is much more eﬀective. To further test our improved algorithm, a
comparison between Algorithms 2 and the basic CCG method, i.e., Algorithm 1 with strong
duality, is given in Table 19. The exit condition is the optimal gap with 1% (O) or the time
limit of 100 minutes (T). As can be seen in Table 19, the basic CCG cannot solve any of
the instances to optimality within the 100-minute time limit. However, our improved algo-
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Table 18: Computational results for RUC subproblem
case ID
strong duality CCG reformulation
exit gap exit time (s)
1 T 1.24% O 28.5 (2 iterations)
2 T 2.01% O 29.9 (2 iterations)
3 T 2.98% O 226.5(3 iterations)
4 T 3.31% O 312.5(3 iterations)
Table 19: Computational results for robust unit commitment
case ID
Algorithm 4 + strong duality Algorithm 5
exit gap exit time (s)
1 T 3.10% O 164
2 T 2.79% O 550
3 T 4.20% O 1325
4 T 4.41% O 3228
rithm can solve all the instances to optimality within the time limit. Generally, we observe
the improved algorithm performs much faster than the basic CCG method and can handle
cases that basic method cannot solve in a reasonably long time. Therefore, it signiﬁcantly
improves our computing capability to handle large-size power grids.
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we developed a new fast computing method for the two-stage robust
unit commitment problem. Strong formulation and network based valid inequalities are
developed to speed up the RUC master problem solution process. For the RUC subproblem,
which is a bi-level program, a novel tri-level reformulation and decomposition strategy is
designed, which actually dramatically decreases the computational complexity of solving
the bi-level program through strong duality based reformulation. The improved algorithm
performs signiﬁcantly faster than the basic CCG method.
91
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUDING REMARKS
This dissertation addresses the issue of uncertainties from terrorist attacks, natural dis-
asters and uncertain demand in the power system operation and planning problems through
a defender-attack-defender game theoretic model or two-stage robust optimization. Decom-
position algorithms are provided, customized and improved to solve each individual problem.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 describe a power system transmission network protection or
hardening planning problem, which is formulated as a defender-attack-defender sequential
game. In Chapter 2, an exact solution is given to the traditional power grid defender-attack-
defender model. The eﬀectiveness of protection is validated through computational studies.
In Chapter 3, network topology control through transmission switching is introduced to the
defender-attacker-defender model as a corrective approach to alleviate system damage under
attack. A nested decomposition algorithm is designed and implement to solve this model.
Cost-eﬀectiveness of network topology control is validated. Chapter 4 proposes a decision
support tool for the planning of a resilient distribution network against uncertain natural
disasters using hardening and distributed generation resources. Chapter 5 presents a fast
computing method for the two-stage robust unit commitment problem.
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